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The Social Network and the
Crowdfund Act: Zuckerberg, Saverin,
and Venture Capitalists' Dilution of
the Crowd
John S. (Jack) Wroldsen*
ABSTRACT
By virtue of Title III of the JOBS Act, signed into law on April
5, 2012, crowdfunding could become a powerful, even revolutionary,
force to finance start-up companies. It democratizes entrepreneurs'
access to seed capital and converts the masses of Internet users into
potential retail venture capitalists. Many have cautioned, though, that
crowdfunding poses serious investment risks of start-up companies
failing, committing fraud, and being mismanaged. Accordingly, the
JOBS Act includes numerous disclosure obligations designed to
mitigate such downside risks.
But what has been overlooked, and what this Article analyzes
from a venture capitalist perspective, is that even if a crowdfunded
start-up company is successful, crowdfunding investors can lose the
value of their investment if they lack venture capital legal protections.
When successful start-up companies raise additional funds from
professional venture capitalists, the value of ground-floor investments
can be severely diluted, as colorfully dramatized in The Social
Network. In addition, when crowdfunded companies are acquired in
private transactions, crowdfunders are at risk of being left out.
Therefore, under a "qualitative mandates" regulatory
philosophy that moves beyond securities law's status-quo disclosure
requirements, this Article proposes substantive venture capitalist
protections for crowdfunding investors. For example, down-round
The Author, J.D., Duke Law School, M.Ed and B.A., The University of Arizona, was
formerly corporate counsel to a technology growth company and practiced at two law firms
advising start-up companies and private equity firms, among other corporate clients. The Author
thanks Eric Chaffee, Nathan Chapman, Kenneth Ching, James Cox, Andrew Verstein, and
Lauren Willis for their insightful comments. Errors, of course, remain solely the Author's.
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anti-dilution protection, tag-along rights, and preemptive rights should
help safeguard the value of early-stage crowdfunding investments in
successful start-up companies. Especially because many crowdfunding
investors are likely to be inexperienced and unsophisticated in
start- up-company investing, crowdfunding laws and regulations
should go beyond disclosure requirements that warn investors of
danger (to the extent investors even read or understand the disclosures)
to help crowdfunders obtain market-based economic protections
characteristic of venture capitalist investment contracts.
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Eduardo Saverin: You issued 24 million new shares of stock? ...
Mark Zuckerberg: You were told that if new investors came along. . .
Eduardo Saverin: How much were your shares diluted? How much were [Sean
Parker's]?
Counsel: What was Mr. Zuckerberg's ownership share diluted down to?
Eduardo Saverin: It wasn't.
Counsel: What was Mr. Moskovitz's, ... Sean Parker's ... and Peter
Thiel's ownership share diluted down to?
Eduardo Saverin: It wasn't.
Counsel: And what was your [original 30 percent] ownership share
diluted down to?
Eduardo Saverin: .03 percent.
-The Social Network'
Though the risk of start-up companies going bankrupt,
defrauding investors, or mismanaging investor funds is significant
and well-documented, an equally serious risk of investing in start-up
companies, as vividly portrayed in The Social Network, is that
investors can lose out on substantial profits when a start-up venture is
successful, if they lack necessary investor protections. This is a
crucial danger of the innovative capital-raising method known as
"crowdfunding" investment, which, as used in this Article, is the
practice of many (i.e., crowds of) people investing small amounts of
money over the Internet in early-stage businesses in exchange for
equity interests that are not registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (Commission).
Securities laws prohibited crowdfunding investment offerings
in the United StateS2 prior to President Obama signing the JOBS Act
on April 5, 2012.3 Title III of the Act provides a securities-law
exemption for crowdfunding investment and directs the Commission
to issue implementing regulations no later than January 1, 2013,4
1. THE SOCIAL NETWORK (Columbia Pictures 2010); see also First Amended
Cross-Complaint at 1, TheFacebook, Inc. v. Saverin, No. 105 CV 039867 (Cal. App. Dep't Super.
Ct. Oct. 5, 2006), 2006 WL 6627814.
2. Of course, prior to the JOBS Act there were a few limited ways that for-profit
businesses could legally raise capital over the Internet, but they did not mesh well with
crowdfunding. See infra note 60.
3. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). In
an abundance of acts, Congress also separately named Title III of the JOBS Act the "Crowdfund
Act." Id. § 301.
4. Id. § 302(c). In implementing the rules, the Commission is guided by its
three-pronged mission to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and
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after which time crowdfunding investment may begin in earnest.
Thirteen entities are joining together to create a self-regulatory
organization known as the Crowdfund Intermediary Regulatory
Association.5  Furthermore, numerous companies are already
planning to provide advisory services and an electronic platform for
crowdfunding investments.6 Meanwhile, countless entrepreneurs are
awaiting the opportunity to sell securities through this novel
capital-raising method and, "[a]s of March 26, 2012, [three] thousand
investors pledged to invest $7.5 million when crowdfunding becomes
legal."7
As the Commission prepares the rules that will govern the
contours of crowdfunding, this Article explores the theoretical and
philosophical tensions in crowdfunding securities regulation and
analyzes a material risk that crowdfunding scholarship and the
crowdfunding provisions of the JOBS Act have neglected. The
crowdfunding debate has focused too narrowly on the downside
potential for crowdfunders to lose their investment to fraudulent,
mismanaged, or failed companies.8  This Article expands the
analytical lens to capture the upside, horizontal risks crowdfunders
will face from other investors, such as venture capitalists, when a
crowdfunded company is successful. Without the economic protections
that sophisticated venture capitalists require when investing in
early-stage-growth companies, crowdfunding investors, like Eduardo
Saverin in The Social Network, are doomed to lose out on the gains
facilitate capital formation. Crowdfunding requires balancing of each prong because of the risks
of retail investing in start-up companies over the Internet and the need for capital-raising
techniques to keep pace with technological developments. The JOBS Act affords the Commission
broad rulemaking authority, such as requiring issuers to "comply with such other requirements
as the Commission may, by rule, prescribe, for the protection of investors and in the public
interest." § 302(b)(b)(5).
5. Alex Wilhelm, Jobs Act, Say Hello to the Crowdfund Intermediary Regulatory
Association, NEXT WEB (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.thenextweb.com/insider/2012/04/05/jobs-act-
say-hello-to-the-crowdfund-intermediary-regulatory-association; see also CROWDFUND
INTERMEDIARY REGULATORY ADVOCATES, http://www.cfira.org (last visited Dec. 10, 2012).
6. E.g., Adrienne Burke, Jobs Act is Law, What Now for Mom-and-Pop Shops?, YAHOO!
SMALL BUSINESS ADVISOR (Apr. 5, 2012, 7:05 PM), http://smallbusiness.yahoo.com/advisor/jobs-
act-is-law--what-now-for-mom-and-pop-shops-.html.
7. 158 CONG. REC. S2,229-31 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 2012) (statement of Sen. Scott Brown).
8. See, e.g., C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1; Edan Burkett, A Crowdfunding Exemption? Online Investment
Crowdfunding and U.S. Securities Regulation, 13 TENN. J. BUS. L. 63 (2011); Thomas Lee Hazen,
Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the Securities Laws-Why the Specially
Tailored Exemption Must be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735 (2012);
Joan MacLeod Heminway & Sheldon Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and
the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879 (2011); Nikki D. Pope, Crowdfunding
Microstartups: It's Time for the Securities and Exchange Commission to Approve a Small
Offering Exemption, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 973 (2011).
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that ground-floor investors typically enjoy after investing in successful
start-up enterprises.
Apart from crowdfunding investment, the Internet community
practiced four other types of crowdfunding prior to the JOBS Act's
passage, and Part I of this Article briefly describes these four types in
order to distinguish the unique features of crowdfunding investment.
Part I also discusses the size and power of the crowdfunding market
and the democratic allocation of capital that crowdfunding facilitates.
Part II then explains the political forces that led to the enactment of
the crowdfunding provisions of the JOBS Act. Bipartisan support,
bolstered by business and grass-roots advocacy and stubbornly high
unemployment rates, was instrumental in helping to legalize
crowdfunding investment. Part II also provides a brief overview of the
crowdfunding provisions of the JOBS Act, which are a positive, if
imperfect, step toward updating securities laws to accommodate
crowdfunding's technologically advanced method of investing.
Part III assesses the underlying theoretical tensions that
crowdfunding investment raises for securities laws. Specifically, it
probes both the dominant disclosure-based philosophy of securities
regulation and the less-favored merit review model. Part III then
proposes a hybrid regulatory approach, one of market-based
"qualitative mandates," that is uniquely appropriate for crowdfunding
investment.
Part IV moves beyond the discussion of both vertical agency
concerns between crowdfunders and company management and
downside risks of fraud, failure, and mismanagement. Instead, it
considers the horizontal, upside risks that will likely threaten the
value of crowdfunders' investments in successful start-up companies
when venture capitalists participate in subsequent rounds of
financing, or when a crowdfunded company pursues a private exit
event.
Finally, Part V describes and applies the qualitative-mandates
proposal and offers suggestions for how legal rules could help
crowdfunders obtain the types of economic protections that venture
capitalists typically negotiate when investing in start-up companies.
It focuses on three possibilities: template contracts, disclosure tables,
and statutory or regulatory provisions.
I. CROWDFUNDING OVERVIEW
A. The Five Models of Crowdfunding
Before examining the type of crowdfunding that the JOBS Act
legalizes, it is helpful to consider briefly the other types of
587
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crowdfunding that have become popular recently. The power and
proliferation of these other types of crowdfunding were instrumental,
and likely indispensable, to the passage of the Act, which applies
solely to crowdfunding investment made in exchange for securities
(usually stock).
Internet crowdfunding divides into five categories, or models,
differentiated by what crowdfunders receive in exchange for their
money: (1) the donation model, (2) the reward model, (3) the
pre-purchase model, (4) the peer-to-peer lending model, and (5) the
equity model.9 Because of the focus of the JOBS Act, this Article is
concerned with only the fifth category, the equity model, but a brief
overview describes the other four models in order to draw attention to
the equity model's unique characteristics. 10
The donation model simply means that crowdfunders donate
money to a cause without receiving anything in return, other than
possibly a tax benefit and satisfaction from whatever else motivates
their donation (e.g., helping to right social wrongs, accruing treasure
in heaven, or furthering their preferred political candidate's
campaign)." In contrast, crowdfunders who give money to a website
operating under the reward model do receive a tangible benefit in
return for their contribution.12 This benefit cannot be a "security,"
such as stock in a company, but the benefit can include almost
anything else, for example, the opportunity to meet the directors of the
movie whose production depended on the crowdfunders' contributions
or a memento such as a T-shirt.13 The pre-purchase model is similar
to the reward model but narrows the scope of the reward to the item
produced as a result of the crowdfunders' contributions, such as a
print of the painting made by the artist who raised funds from the
crowd or a copy of the video game created by the game makers that
received contributions from fans.1
The lending model, also known as peer-to-peer lending,
includes websites where crowdfunders make loans, with or without
interest, and thus expect to receive their contribution back in the
9. Bradford, supra note 8, at 14-15.
10. The JOBS Act does not prohibit companies from selling debt securities through
crowdfunding, so the equity model potentially includes non-equity (i.e., debt) securities and
hybrid securities that include both debt and equity components. The Act does not affect the
peer-to-peer lending model of crowdfunding, though, because the Act requires recipients of
crowdfunding proceeds to be entities (i.e., not natural persons), which removes the peer-to-peer
lending model of crowdfunding from the scope of the Act.
11. Bradford, supra note 8, at 15-16.
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future.15 Interest-bearing loans, like stock, are securities subject to
regulation by the Commission; hence, the Commission has required
some peer-to-peer lenders to register their securities with the
Commission because no exemption from registration exists for
crowdfunded debt securities.16
Finally, the equity model differs from all other types of
crowdfunding because crowdfunders invest money in order to receive
ownership interests in a company.17 This unique characteristic of the
equity model has had far-reaching implications because, while
securities laws have allowed other types of crowdfunding to flourish,18
they have impeded the development of the crowdfunding investment
model. 19
Thus, prior to the JOBS Act, the law produced a curious result.
On the one hand, it permitted nonprofits and artists to raise an
unlimited amount of money over the Internet from crowds of strangers
with virtually no legal restrictions or oversight. But on the other
hand, the law prohibited for-profit entrepreneurs from using the
Internet to raise start-up capital for a business without going through
costly registration or exemption procedures.20  This discrepant
treatment was based simply on what crowdfunders received or
expected to receive (namely, a security such as stock) in exchange for
their money.21 This perceived unfairness to entrepreneurs and the
15. Id. at 20-24. Individual lenders who loan money through Kiva.org, discussed below,
do not receive interest payments, and one article argues that such lenders should "be given the
option of taking a charitable deduction for that foregone interest." Sarah B. Lawsky, Money for
Nothing: Charitable Deductions for Microfinance Lenders, 61 SMU L. REV. 1525, 1527 (2008).
16. E.g., Bradford, supra note 8, at 34-42; Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 8, at
890-91; Andrew Verstein, The Misregulation of Person-To-Person Lending, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
445, 448 (2011).
17. Bradford, supra note 8, at 24-27.
18. The peer-to-peer lending model with interest-bearing loans is regulated under
securities laws. Id. at 34-42. Lending companies have registered the loans under securities laws
in order to proceed with the practice. Eric C. Chaffee & Geoffrey C. Rapp, Regulating Online
Peer-To-Peer Lending in the Aftermath of Dodd-Frank: In Search of an Evolving Regulatory
Regime for an Evolving Industry, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 485, 509-19 (2012); Verstein, supra
note 16, at 475-77.
19. The full analysis of why crowdfunding investment ran afoul of securities laws prior
to enactment of the JOBS Act has been described elsewhere. See, e.g., Chaffee & Rapp, supra
note 18, at 509-19. In brief, Internet platforms that facilitate crowdfunding investment would
likely need to register with the Commission as broker-dealers, and crowdfunded securities would
either need to be registered with the Commission or fall within an exemption from registration.
See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 8, at 49-81. Prior to the Act, no exemption was available for
crowdfunded securities. See, e.g., id. at 29-80; Hazen, supra note 8, at 1744-50; Heminway &
Hoffman, supra note 8, at 892-907; Pope, supra note 8, at 986-93.
20. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
21. Bradford, supra note 8, at 30-42.
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unquestioned power of crowdfunding to raise money for a cause led to
political pressure that culminated in the JOBS Act.2 2
B. Examples of Crowdfunding
Before moving to the discussion of the political forces that led
to the JOBS Act, a few examples of crowdfunding in action will help
explain why crowdfunding has captured the attention and imagination
of such diverse groups as nonprofit organizations, artists,
businesspeople, political leaders, the press, and academics. In short,
crowdfunding is extremely powerful and scalable to a wide variety of
projects. It also strikes a chord with the spirit of democracy and
equality in the United States by harnessing masses of people toward a
common goal. 23
The impact of Internet crowdfunding was shown recently when
video-game makers raised over $3 million in approximately one
month24 from more than eighty-seven thousand game aficionados
eager to fund the creation of a new point-and-click video game, Double
Fine Adventure.2 5 After eight hours, the campaign reached its target
funding amount of $400,000, and after twenty-four hours it surpassed
$1 million.26  In exchange for monetary contributions, each
crowdfunder was entitled to receive the cumulative rewards set forth
in the following table.27
22. Id. at 81-99.
23. Crowdfunding's antecedent is crowdsourcing, which harnesses the knowledge of the
crowd (as opposed to raising money from the crowd) to solve complex problems. See, e.g., Pope,
supra note 8, at 975-77 (describing examples of crowdsourcing, such as open source software and
Netflix's online competition to create an improved "movie recommendation algorithm").
24. Mike Flacy, Double Fine Raises over $3 Million on Kickstarter for New Adventure
Game, DIGITAL TRENDS (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.digitaltrends.com/gaming/double-fine-raises-
over-3-million-on-kickstarter-for-new-adventure-game.
25. Double Fine Adventure, KICKSTARTER (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.kickstarter.com/
projects/66710809/double-fine-adventure.
26. Dan Nosowitz, Double Fine Smashes Kickstarter Record, Raises $400,000 in Eight
Hours for Next Videogame, POPULAR SCI. (Feb. 9, 2012, 2:20 PM), http://www.popsci.com/
technology/article/2012-02/double-fine-productions-smashes-kickstarter-record-raises-400000-
eight-hours-next-videogame; Mike Snider, Video Game Makers Use Crowd-Sourced Funding for
New Project, USA TODAY (Feb. 9, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/gaming/story/2012-
02-09/game-funding-crowdsourced/53031998/1.
27. Double Fine Adventure, supra note 25.
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Double Fine Adventure Crowdfunding Campaign
Contribution Number of Total Reward
Amount Contributors Contributions
$15 47,946 $719,190 Access to Double Fine
Adventure private
discussion community,
beta version of the game,
and a copy of the final
version.
$30 24,636 $739,080 High-definition
documentary and
soundtrack.
$60 1,090 $65,400 PDF version of Double
Fine Adventure book.
$100 11,530 $1,153,000 Special-edition box
containing game disc and
DVD or Blu-Ray of the
documentary, T-shirt,
poster, and special
thanks in the game's
credits.
$250 900 $225,000 Autographed poster.
$500 148 $74,000 Autographed hardcover
game book.
$1,000 100 $100,000 Mini-portrait of
contributor.
$5,000 10 $50,000 Larger original painting
of art used in the game.
$10,000 4 $40,000 Lunch with game
designers and tour of
offices.
In true crowdfunding form, approximately 99 percent of the
backers contributed less than $500 and accounted for approximately
92 percent of the total contributions.2 8 The example highlights the
essence of crowdfunding: relying on many small contributions from a
large crowd instead of on high-dollar contributions from a small group
of supporters.
28. Id. The percentage calculations are derived from the numbers in the table, which
was created from the information on Kickstarter's website. It is not clear why the total amounts
in the table do not match exactly the totals provided on Kickstarter's website; thus, all figures
and amounts should be understood as approximations.
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This example illustrates the power of the crowd to exert direct
influence over corporate decision making and consolidate multiple
business tasks into one. Whereas without crowdfunding, a company
would have to engage in market research to understand and know its
customers, fund the development of a product through debt or equity
financing, market the product to potential customers, and ultimately
sell the product to its customers (often through a middleman),
crowdfunding accomplishes each of these tasks. It allows the Internet
community to simultaneously express market demand, finance
product development, and deliver a revenue base of prepaid
customers-all without a middleman, likely increasing the company's
profit margin.29  Crowdfunding thus embodies "Web 2.0," which
capitalizes on the wisdom of the crowd and involves users in the
creative process.30 "Web 1.0," on the other hand, follows a more
traditional, authoritarian model in which companies publish
information for passive users to consume.31
Web 2.0 companies such as Kiva, Kickstarter, and IndieGoGo
are the most well known of the crowdfunding sites, but countless
others exist, including many based outside the United States.32 Kiva
facilitates people making micro loans to third-world business owners,
and Kickstarter and IndieGoGo primarily help artists, such as
independent filmmakers, receive funds to pursue artistic projects.33
Kiva has facilitated over $330 million being raised from more than
780,000 individual lenders to fund loans to over 815,000 recipients
around the world.34 Kickstarter has facilitated over $275 million in
contributions to fund nearly 26,000 artistic and other projects.35 The
peer-to-peer lending industry is already approximately $1.5 billion in
size and is projected to "exceed $5 billion annually by 2013, with some
even suggesting figures greater than $30 billion." 36 Politicians also
29. Daniel M. Satorius & Stu Pollard, Crowd Funding: What Independent Producers
Should Know About the Legal Pitfalls, 28 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 15, 16 (2010) ("Finally, if crowd
funding involves the sale of tickets, copies of the film, or merchandise, the lack of middlemen in
these transactions means the producers keep a larger percentage of the subsequent revenues.").
30. Chaffee & Rapp, supra note 18, at 501-02.
31. Id. at 502.
32. See Bradford, supra note 8, at 11-14 (referencing numerous crowdfunding sites);
Burkett, supra note 8, at 74-76 (describing crowdfunding-investment websites outside the
United States, such as "Hong-Kong based Grow VC . . . along with its Indian partner,
Springboard Ventures").
33. About, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about (last visited July 8, 2012); Kickstarter
Basics: Kickstarter 101, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/help/faqlkickstarter%20basics
(last visited Nov. 8, 2012); Learn How to Raise Money for an Idea, INDIEGOGO,
http://www.indiegogo.com/learn-how-to-raise-money-for-a-campaign (last visited July 8, 2012).
34. Statistics, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about/stats (last visited Nov. 8, 2012).
35. Kickstarter Basics: Kickstarter 101, supra note 33.
36. Verstein, supra note 16, at 447 (footnote omitted).
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rely heavily on Internet crowdfunding contributions; for instance,
President Obama's campaign "used crowd funding to raise about
$1 million a day, all online, with more than a million sub-$1,000
contributions. In all, the campaign raised nearly three-quarters of a
billion dollars over the Internet."37
Additional examples abound,38 but Kickstarter's largest
crowdfunded project to date is particularly instructive. The campaign
raised over $10 million in thirty-six days, as people flocked to the
"Pebble" proposal to receive an "infinitely customizable" wristwatch
that downloads information from a smart-phone.39 The campaign met
its goal of raising $100,000 after only two hours and received $4.7
million after six days.40  The watch is expected to retail at
approximately $150,41 and the company offered a pre-order discount to
crowdfunders: the first two hundred "early-bird" participants
contributed $99 dollars for a pre-ordered watch, and then others could
receive a black watch for $115 or a color watch for $125.42 Prior to
Pebble's crowdfunding success, the company had struggled to raise
funds from traditional venture capitalists,43  but Internet
crowdfunding allowed the company to go directly to its customers and
capitalize on an outpouring of market demand.
37. Satorius & Pollard, supra note 29.
38. For instance, the film Blue Like Jazz was funded by the crowd, with 4,495
crowdfunders participating to raise $345,992. Steve Taylor, SAVE Blue Like Jazz! (The Movie),
KICKSTARTER (Sept. 24, 2010), http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/2128223578/save-blue-like-
jazz-the-movie-0. Fifty people contributed more than $500 each (approximately $78,000 total,
representing approximately 23 percent of all funds), meaning that approximately 99 percent of
backers contributed less than $500 each, representing approximately 77 percent of all
contributions. Id. In exchange, crowdfunders received rewards depending on the amount of their
contribution: for a $10 contribution, crowdfunders received a "digital download package" and a
phone call from the film's director; for $125, the previous rewards, plus a t-shirt, poster, coffee
mug and the crowdfunder's name listed in the movie's credits; for the highest contribution tier of
$8,000, the author of the book on which the movie was based would fly to the crowdfunder's city
(within the United States) for a book reading at the crowdfunder's home. Id.
39. See Pebble Tech., Pebble: E-Paper Watch for iPhone and Android, KICKSTARTER
(Apr. 11, 2012), http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/597507018/pebble-e-paper-watch-for-iphone-
and-android.
40. Deborah Netburn, Pebble Smartwatch Raises $4.7 Million on Kickstarter Funding
Site, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/18/business/la-fi-tn-pebble-
smart-watch-kickstarter-20120418.
41. See Pebble Tech., supra note 39.
42. Id. Also, among other reward and pre-purchase tiers, Internet application
developers could receive an early Pebble prototype and a color Pebble, once complete, for $235.
Id.
43. Netburn, supra note 40.
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C. The Transformative Power of Crowdfunding
These examples show the revolutionary power of Internet
crowdfunding. It gives any person in the world with access to the
Internet the opportunity to propose an idea to the Internet community
and receive immediate feedback on whether the idea is worthy of
attention and funding. In an economic and financial sense,
crowdfunding epitomizes the democratic ideals of the United States:
when Justice Holmes penned the words in 1919 that spawned the
marketplace-of-ideas theory ("the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas . . . the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market. . ."),44 it would have been difficult to imagine how inclusive
and instantaneous the marketplace would someday become through
the Internet.
It is no exaggeration that crowdfunding could well mark a
"revolution in how the general public allocates capital,"45 or at least
represent a democratic leveling of how, and whose, ideas are financed.
As one senator noted during the Senate's debate on what became the
crowdfunding provisions of the JOBS Act, "We want to support our
entrepreneurs. We want to make this process more democratic. We
want to get out of the secret boardrooms and the private conversations
on Wall Street. So many more people could take advantage,
appropriately, of exciting investments in the entrepreneurial spirit of
America."46 Similarly, another senator marveled at the "enormous
potential [of crowdfunding investment] to bring more Americans than
ever into the exciting process of powering up startups and expanding
small businesses."47 Undoubtedly, the democratic spirit and huge
potential impact of crowdfunding investment influenced politicians to
embrace the concept and pass the JOBS Act.
44. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see
generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 1982) (1859) (espousing
similar ideas to what later became known as the marketplace of ideas theory).
45. Bradford, supra note 8, at 5.
46. 158 CONG. REC. S1,830 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2012) (statement of Sen. Mary Landrieu).
47. Without addressing potential adverse tax consequences:
In 2011, Americans had invested $17 trillion in retirement funds. Imagine if 1 percent
of those investments went into crowdfunding. The result would be $170 billion of
investment in our startups and small businesses. That is extraordinarily
powerful-more powerful than loans to small businesses.. . . So it has huge potential.
158 CONG. REc. S1,829 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2012) (statement of Sen. Jeffrey Merkley).
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II. POLITICAL INFLUENCES
A. Securities-Law Prohibitions on Crowdfunding
With crowdfunding's appealing democratic themes, the JOBS
Act received bipartisan political support, and President Obama
promptly signed it into law. In contrast to the examples of successful
non-equity crowdfunding described above, the following two examples
of how securities laws blocked crowdfunding investment illustrate
why, from a political perspective, the JOBS Act is necessary. The two
examples below demonstrate that crowdfunding sites that facilitate
stock transactions, and companies that sell stock through
crowdfunding, receive disparate and unfavorable treatment under the
law, compared to crowdfunding sites and entrepreneurs that provide
other, non-equity, benefits to crowdfunders.48 Especially during a
time of high unemployment, it can be difficult for politicians to explain
why nonprofits, artists, and politicians themselves can use
crowdfunding to raise money, but start-up companies seeking to
innovate and create jobs are prohibited from using crowdfunding.49
In 2010, ProFounder Financial, Inc. (ProFounder) operated a
website to assist start-up and small businesses in raising capital over
the Internet through crowdfunding investment.SO ProFounder's
website provided start-up companies with stock-offering materials,
including investment contract templates, that the start-up companies
could use to sell securities to investors.51  This business model
48. 158 CONG. REc. S1,887 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2012) (statement of Sen. Jeffrey Merkley)
(describing the peer-to-peer lending model of crowdfunding and asserting that "what
crowdfunding [investment] does is to create an equal opportunity for folks to invest in
early-stage businesses").
49. 158 CONG. REC. H1,592 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2012) (statement of Rep. James Himes)
("[W]hen you give to a charity, you know you're not getting your money back. When you invest in
a company, you hope you're getting your money back. And we should be vigilant that that, in
fact, occurs."). Additionally, Senator Merkley stated:
[W]hat we do not have is a process in which companies can list themselves on the
Internet and say: Do you want to invest in my company? . . . It is parallel to these
other efforts . . . . [But] if we do not provide rules that require accountability for the
accuracy of that information, then what we are simply doing is saying here is a Web
site where predators can put up a fictitious story about what they want to do, make it
as exciting as possible, and run away with people's money ....
158 CONG. REC. S1,828 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2012) (statement of Sen. Jeffrey Merkley).
50. Consent Order to Desist and Refrain from State of California Department of
Corporations to ProFounder Fin., Inc., 1 (Aug. 31, 2011), available at www.corp.ca.gov/ENF/
pdfl2011/ProFounderCO.pdf [hereinafter ProFounder Order]; see also Bradford, supra note 8, at
24-27 (discussing ProFounder).
51. In a nod to securities law requirements under Rule 504 of Regulation D, discussed
below, ProFounder did require potential investors to represent that they had a "substantial,
preexisting relationship" with the start-up company in which they invested, but "ProFounder did
not attempt to verify independently that the substantial preexisting relationships in fact existed
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subjected ProFounder to a complex web of state and federal laws and
regulations, both with respect to its status as a broker-dealer of
securities as well as in relation to the securities offered on its
website.52 Having failed to obtain the necessary licenses to operate
the ProFounder website, in August of 2011 ProFounder entered into a
Consent Order to Desist and Refrain with the State of California,
agreeing not to operate "any website that induces securities to be sold
over the Internet" without first obtaining the necessary legal
authorizations and licenses.53
Similarly, in 2011 the Commission issued a cease-and-desist
order against the organizers of an Internet campaign that gathered
investment commitments to fund the purchase of Pabst Brewing
Company (Pabst).54 In exchange for contributors' financial pledges,
contributors would receive not only beer but also ownership
certificates, which placed the campaign squarely within the equity
model of crowdfunding because ownership certificates are included
within the definition of a security.55 Thus, for failing to register the
securities with the Commission, the campaign was forced to close,
despite more than five million people having pledged approximately
$200 million to buy Pabst during the six months that the campaign
was open.56 Had the campaign organizers promised participants only
beer (a reward), and not ownership certificates (a security), the
campaign would likely have fallen outside the equity model of
crowdfunding and would probably not have encountered regulatory
hurdles. Of course, without offering ownership certificates, the
campaign might have attracted fewer pledges because the ownership
certificates (as much as or more than the beer) might have motivated
supporters to participate in the campaign.
In the case of the Pabst campaign that raised $200 million in
pledges, the campaign organizers, with the benefit of hindsight,
presumably could have afforded the "hundreds of thousands of dollars"
it typically costs to register securities with the Commission prior to a
public offering.57 But most crowdfunding offerings do not seek to raise
or that the issuers were complying with the terms of any" securities law requirements.
ProFounder Order, supra note 50, at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
52. Id. at 3.
53. Id.
54. Cease-and-Desist Order for Michael Migliozzi II and Brian William Flatow,
Securities Act Release No. 9216 (June 8, 2011), available at http://www.sec.govllitigation/admin/
2011/33-9216.pdf.
55. Id. at 3.
56. Bradford, supra note 8, at 6 (citing Chad Bray, Huge Beer Run Halted by Those No
Fun D.C. Regulators, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (June 8, 2011, 4:05 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/
2011/06/08/huge-beer-run-halted-by-those-no-fun-d-c-regulators).
57. Id. at 42.
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hundreds of millions of dollars,58 and "registration is not a viable
option for early-stage small businesses seeking relatively small
amounts of capital. It is too expensive and too time consuming for
crowdfunded offerings."59  Alternatively, crowdfunding-investment
offerings could have attempted to qualify for an exemption from
registration, but "[u]nfortunately, none of those exemptions is
conducive to crowdfunding."60 As a result, without the Commission
crafting a regulatory exemption61 or Congress creating a statutory
path for crowdfunding investment, the law prevented the growth of
the equity model of crowdfunding while other crowdfunding models
continued to expand.
B. Democratic Push for Crowdfunding
In view of securities-law prohibitions on crowdfunding
investment, a cross section of political and business leaders and
grass-roots Internet activists came together to advocate for the
legalization of equity crowdfunding.62 An IndieGoGo crowdfunding
campaign (under the donation model of crowdfunding) even provided
an opportunity for people to contribute to mobilization and publicity
efforts to legalize equity crowdfunding (the campaign raised $1,321).63
58. In any case, as discussed below, the JOBS Act only allows a company to raise
$1 million per year through crowdfunding investment. See infra note 80 and accompanying text;
see also Bradford, supra note 8, at 11 (citing a study that found the median amount raised in
crowdfunding offerings to be $28,583 and the largest amount raised to be $82 million).
59. Bradford, supra note 8, at 42 (footnote omitted); Heminway & Hoffman, supra note
8, at 911 ("[Registration is a nonstarter for most crowdfunding websites and crowdfunded
ventures because of the expense and prolonged nature of the process.").
60. Bradford, supra note 8, at 44 (discussing why several possible exemptions, such as
offerings under Section 4(2), Rules 504, 505 and 506, Section 4(5), and Regulation A, fail to
accommodate crowdfunding investment). Burkett reaches similar conclusions. See Burkett,
supra note 8, at 80-92; Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 8, at 912-31; Pope, supra note 8, at
986-93.
61. Bradford, supra note 8, at 87 ("The SEC clearly has the authority to exempt
crowdfunding [investment] from the registration requirements of the Securities Act and to
exempt crowdfunding [investment] web sites from registration as brokers or investment
advisers."); Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 8, at 950 ("[E]xisting regulation offers ample
opportunity for the SEC to act without a grant of additional congressional authority.").
62. 158 CONG. REc. S2,230 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 2012) (statement of Sen. Scott Brown).
The Congressional Record noted that, among other efforts to legalize crowdfunding investment,
"Entrepreneurs from the Cambridge Innovation Center created a petition to show Congress their
support for crowdfunding [investment]. These entrepreneurs founded wefunder.com to rally
support for crowdfunding [investment] . . . [and, along with] MassChallenge, a not-for-profit
organization dedicated to supporting the work of entrepreneurs, hosted a roundtable on
crowdfunding [investment] in Boston." Id.; see also How 3 Guys Legalized Crowdfunding in 460
Days, STARTUP EXEMPTION (May 21, 2012), http://www.startupexemption.com/archives/300#
axzz205G8GrDY.
63. Crowdfunding Campaign to Change Crowdfunding Law, INDIEGOGo, http://www.
indiegogo.com/Change-Crowdfunding-Law (last visited July 8, 2012).
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In late 2011, a flurry of legislative activity occurred, with the House of
Representatives passing its version of a crowdfunding investment law,
the Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act,64 and the Senate introducing,
first, the Democratizing Access to Capital Act of 2011,65 and then
another version, the Crowdfund Act, which became Title III of the
JOBS Act.66
Numerous commentators assailed the House version for its
lack of investor protections, and it even earned the label of the "'Boiler
Room Legalization Act'-a reference to the bad old days when people
gathered in what were called boiler rooms and made cold calls to try to
elicit unwary investors into dubious schemes."67  One senator
remarked that "the House bill essentially legalizes the business model
of unscrupulous boiler rooms,"68 and another described it as "a
pathway to predatory scams . . . [because it required] no information
to be provided by a company; and if the company provides information,
it requires no responsibility or accountability for the accuracy of that
information."6 9 As a result of the widespread criticism of the House
version in the media, from the Commission, and by special interest
groups,70 the Senate introduced numerous investor protections into
64. Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act, H.R. 2930, 112th Cong. (2011).
65. Democratizing Access to Capital Act of 2011, S. 1791, 112th Cong. (2011).
66. Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act of
2011, S. 1970, 112th Cong. (2011); see also 158 CONG. REc. S2,230 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 2012)
(statement of Sen. Scott Brown) (reviewing a timeline of some of the versions of what became
Title III of the Act); Bradford, supra note 8, at 89-98 (discussing the three legislative proposals);
Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 8, at 883-84 (describing the Commission's and Congress's
consideration of crowdfunding investment).
67. 158 CONG. REC. S1,766 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2012) (statement of Sen. Harry Reed)
(referencing "the concerns expressed by Professor John Coffee of the Columbia University School
of Law").
68. 158 CONG. REC. S1,781 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2012) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin).
69. 158 CONG. REC. S1,972-76 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2012) (statement of Sen. Jeffrey
Merkley); see also 158 CONG. REC. S1,825 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2012) (statement of Sen. Tom
Harkin) ("In the name of helping small business, the [House] bill takes a meat ax to the very
investor protection laws that have allowed our capital markets to flourish.").
70. E.g., 158 CONG. REc. S1,974 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2012) (statement of Sen. Barbara
Boxer) (noting that "SEC Chair Mary Schapiro and SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar have raised
concerns that [the House] bill will hinder securities law enforcement and reduce investor
protection," and listing other sources of criticism, including Bloomberg News, The New York
Times Editorial Board, CalPERS, CalSTRS, "Americans for Financial Reform, AARP, AFL-CIO,
AFCSME, Consumer Federation of America, the Main Street Alliance, [and] the Sustainable
Business Council"); 158 CONG. REC. S1,973 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2012) (statement of Sen. Jeffrey
Merkley) (describing opposition to the House version even from crowdfunding investment portals
Launcht and SoMoLend); 158 CONG. REC. S1,723 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2012) (letter of Mary
Schapiro, S.E.C. Chairman) (suggesting that the crowdfunding investment exemption "should
include a description of the business or the business plan, financial information, a summary of
the risks facing the business, a description of the voting rights and other rights of the stock being
offered, and ongoing updates on the status of the business").
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the final version of the law. 71
The resulting crowdfunding provisions of the JOBS Act are a
classic example of the compromises that characterize a democratic
system. One Republican congressman lamented that the final law
includes "ill-conceived and burdensome changes"72 to the House
version and "is riddled with burdens on issuers, investors, and
intermediaries and . . . enhances [the Commission's] rulemaking
authority."73 Meanwhile, one Democratic congressman complained
that the revisions the Senate introduced do "not go far enough to
ensure that investors will be protected from unscrupulous actors,"74
and a senator warned that the Senate's revisions, "though welcome,
are far from sufficient. We are about to embark upon the most
sweeping deregulatory effort and assault on investor protection in
decades."75  In the end, the Senate's version received bipartisan
support, passing the House by a 380 to 41 vote margin76 and the
Senate by a 73 to 26 vote margin.77
C. Crowdfunding under the JOBS Act
This section provides only a brief sketch of some of the most
salient characteristics of the JOBS Act's crowdfunding provisions.78
The Act tasks the Commission with implementing regulations that
will define the full extent of the numerous proscriptions and
prohibitions on crowdfunding investment. Also, the Act affords the
Commission the discretion to create additional requirements that the
Commission finds necessary "for the protection of investors and in the
public interest."7 9
The Act allows start-up companies to raise up to $1 million
through crowdfunding in any twelve-month period.80 In addition, the
71. Bradford, supra note 8, at 91-98.
72. 158 CONG. REC. H1,592 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2012) (statement of Rep. James Himes)
(recounting Rep. McHenry's comments on the bill).
73. 158 CONG. REC. H1,592 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2012) (statement of Rep. Patrick
McHenry).
74. 158 CONG. REC. H1,593 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2012) (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler).
75. 158 CONG. REC. S1,964 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2012) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin); see
also Chaffee & Rapp, supra note 18, at 530 (asserting that, historically, "underregulated
financial services industries grow quickly until they suffer a dramatic crash").
76. 158 CONG. REC. H1,598 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2012) (statement of Rep. Jason Chaffetz).
77. 158 CONG. REC. S2,229 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 2012) (statement of Sen. Pat Toomey).
78. For a more thorough treatment of the crowdfunding provisions of the JOBS Act, see,
for example, C. Steven Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption: Promise
Unfulfilled, 40 SEC. REG. L.J. 195 (2012) [hereinafter Promise Unfulfilled].
79. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(b)(b)(1)(I) 126
Stat. 306 (2012).
80. Id. § 302(a)(6).
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cap on the amount any person may invest increases in accordance
with the investor's annual income or net worth (e.g., from a low of
$2,000 for investors with an annual income or net worth up to
$40,000, to a high of 10 percent of an investor's annual income or net
worth above $100,000).81 The cap on each investor applies to the
investor's aggregate crowdfunding investments in any twelve-month
period, not to each investment.82
Another fundamental component of the Act is that all
crowdfunding investments must occur through a website that has
registered with the Commission (either as a "funding portal" or a
broker).83 The Act places substantial obligations on these websites,
such as disclosing information related to the risks of investing in
start-up companies, ensuring that each investor affirms an
understanding of the risks of crowdfunding investments, and
obtaining a background check on key company personnel. 84
Furthermore, on an annual basis, a crowdfunded company
must provide its financial statements and a report of the results of the
company's operations.8 5  Companies must also make disclosures
related to key company personnel, the company's business, and its
intended use of investment proceeds.8 6 In addition, the Act requires
disclosures in potentially complex areas of corporate law and finance,
such as a description of the company's capital structure, the terms of
the company's securities (including how the terms may be modified,
the differences among the classes of securities, and how other classes
of securities may materially affect the rights of the crowdfunded
securities), the valuation of the crowdfunded securities, and the risks
of owning a minority equity interest in the company.8 7
Some of the disclosures summarized above (e.g., the effect of
one class of securities on another, corporate events, minority positions)
touch on issues of concern to venture capitalist investors. But the
disclosure requirements are insufficient-indeed, disclosure
requirements alone are the wrong mechanism-to protect the value of
crowdfunders' investments if the crowdfunded company succeeds. The




83. Id. § 302(b)(a)(1).
84. Id. § 302(b)(a)(2)-(12).
85. Id. § 302(b)(b)(4).
86. Id. § 302(b)(b)(1).
87. Id. § 302(b)(b)(1)(H).
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III. THEORETICAL TENSIONS
Crowdfunding investment challenges many of the tenets of
paper-based securities laws because it relies on the Internet to
facilitate mass electronic investment in start-up companies, which
would have been impossible in the 1930s when Congress enacted the
legislation that continues to govern federal securities regulation.88
Unfortunately, the crowdfunding provisions of the JOBS Act reflect a
deductive approach to regulating crowdfunding investment because
they squeeze a modern-day investing technique into a dated
regulatory scheme.89 In contrast, an inductive approach would focus
on the importance of matching an innovative regulatory strategy to
the innovative practice of crowdfunding investment. 90
Prior to passage of the Act, several articles urged the
Commission to create an exemption from registration for
crowdfunding investment offerings, and one was especially clear in its
preference for a deductive regulatory approach, citing "legal transition
costs ... [that] are inevitable in any legal rule change .... The
[Commission] can reduce these types of costs by constructing any new
crowdfunding exemption in a way that minimizes variation from the
existing registration exemption scheme . . . ."91 In this deductive
approach, the "existing exemptive framework" is the starting point of
the analysis, and the end goal is to minimize disruption of the status
quo. 92
Though friction from change, transaction costs, and
legal-transition costs are real and should be factored into a
cost-benefit analysis of any legal rule change, the flaw in applying a
88. The principles and framework codified by the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Exchange Act of 1934 remain the foundation of federal securities laws. 158 CONG. REC. H1,592
(daily ed. Mar. 27, 2012) (statement of Rep. Patrick McHenry) (discussing crowdfunding
investment and referencing a letter from Oversight Chairman Darrell Issa to the Commission
"that really challenged the Commission's complacency and asked them about these 80-year-old
regulations that were modern at the time where the new invention was the telephone and asked
them if they had ways to update them").
89. While a deductive approach is "top down," giving priority to existing legal regimes
and principles and seeking to accommodate new phenomena within established legal
frameworks, an inductive approach is "bottom up," giving priority to new phenomena and
seeking to revise existing legal frameworks to meet innovative demands. See, e.g., Bryan L.
Walser, Shared Technical Decisionmaking and the Disaggregation of Sovereignty: International
Regulatory Policy, Expert Communities, and the Multinational Pharmaceutical Industry, 72 TUL.
L. REV. 1597, 1602 (1998) (describing the deductive approach as "proceeding from first principles
towards a specific policy option" and the inductive approach as "proceeding from the analysis of a
series of case histories towards some operational conclusion").
90. Id.
91. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 8, at 940-41.
92. Id. at 941.
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deductive regulatory approach to new technologies is that it treats the
innovative practice as secondary to its primary concern of maintaining
the existing regulatory framework. The result, perhaps unintentional,
is adherence to outdated regulatory systems even when they are a
poor match for the innovative practice they seek to regulate. 93
Instead, Congress and the Commission should design
crowdfunding laws and regulations inductively in order to tailor them
as much as possible to the specific risks of crowdfunding investment.
Historically, the Commission's regulations have been "modest in
[their] adaptations to new environments, changing only in small steps,
as opposed to allowing for new visions and accepting of sweeping
innovations."9 4  Unfortunately, this sort of "detailed, incremental
regulation fails when the underlying economics or competitive context,
or the technology itself, moves other than in slow incremental steps.
In that instance, a broader, bolder approach is not only desirable, but
necessary."95 This Article argues that crowdfunding investment is one
such instance, and therefore an innovative, bold regulatory approach
is appropriate.
Compared to the technology and investing practices of the
1930s, the Internet's fusion of electronic investment and social
networking through crowdfunding is a leap-not a slow, incremental
step-forward that allows the direct participation of many people to
vote with their money on the most popular ideas for start-up
companies. Crowdfunding exemplifies the democratic marketplace of
ideas because the Internet provides equal and direct access to start-up
ventures, and the Internet community collectively selects the ones
deemed worthy of funding.96 From an economic perspective,
93. Broc Romanek & Julie Hoffman, A New Day Dawning for E-Communications
During the Offering Process, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 365, 365 (2006) (observing, and citing reports
indicating, that the Commission "has long recognized, [that] the federal securities laws
crafted . . . [in the 1930s] do not neatly fit in an electronic world"); Verstein, supra note 16, at 518
(lamenting the Commission's "culture that is inherently insensitive to the risks of misregulating
emerging industries . . . [, resulting in] a long history of trying to fit new pegs into old holes,
[and] fundamentally misunderstanding financial innovations in order to apply old frameworks");
see also Chaffee & Rapp, supra note 18, at 490 ("Online P2P sites have faced tough scrutiny at
the hands of American securities regulators, both on the state and federal levels. . . . Much of the
regulatory uncertainty surrounding how these sites should be classified stems from what might
be described as a 'square peg, round hole' problem. Existing structures for securities regulation
have simply not envisioned an investment opportunity in which the party seeking financing
provides little or no disclosure . . . ." (footnotes omitted)).
94. Steven M.H. Wallman, Competition, Innovation, and Regulation in the Securities
Markets, 53 Bus. LAW. 341, 344 (1998).
95. Id. at 348.
96. The marketplace of ideas is an appropriate metaphor to apply to crowdfunding
investors' selection of the most popular start-up company ideas; however, the marketplace of
ideas theory, standing alone, is not sufficient to rely on to protect investors from the risks of
crowdfunding investment. For an analysis of the ability of the marketplace of ideas to decipher
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crowdfunding thus resembles original Athenian direct democracy even
more than modern representative democracy.97 As such, it is fitting
that the paternalistic themes embodied in Plato's conception of a
ruling class of philosopher kings98 (and queens)"9 also animate the
crowdfunding-investment debate.100 As described below, historical
precedent demonstrates the need for investor protections when small
businesses sell unregistered stock to unsophisticated investors over
the Internet, as the JOBS Act permits start-up companies to do.
A. Paternalistic Impulses: The Rule 504 Lesson
Other than a failed seven-year experiment in the 1990s under
Rule 504 of Regulation D, 101 never before have everyday citizens had
such direct access to investing in start-up companies, and never before
have start-up companies had such direct access to public markets.
When Rule 504 permitted small companies to offer unregistered
securities to the general public without substantive disclosures,
unscrupulous promoters capitalized to "facilitate a number of
truth and error, see, for example, Christopher T. Wonnell, Truth and the Marketplace of Ideas,
19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 669, 672-76 (1986) (summarizing criticisms of the marketplace of ideas
theory and restating the two predictions of the theory: "a society that permits free speech will
find itself nearer to the truth . .. [and] exhibit more progress toward truth over time than an
otherwise similar society that proscribes free speech").
97. Keith Werhan, The Classical Athenian Ancestry of American Freedom of Speech,
2008 SUP. CT. REV. 293, 294-95 (distinguishing the high level of citizens' direct involvement in
Athenian government from the representative nature of American democracy); see also ANTHONY
KENNY, AN ILLUSTRATED BRIEF HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 21-22 (2006) ("[Athenian
democracy] was not like a modern democracy, in which the citizens elect representatives to form
a government. Rather, each citizen had the right personally to take part in government . . . . The
judiciary and the legislature in Athens were drawn by lot . . . , laws were passed by a panel of
1,000 chosen for one day only, and major trials were conducted before a jury of 501.").
98. PLATO, The Republic, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 428d-e, 473c-d
(Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Lane Cooper trans., Princeton University Press
2005).
99. Inclusion of "philosopher queens" is self-evident today, no less notably than at the
Commission, where Mary Schapiro was, until November 2012, the Chairman. It also may have
been Plato's intent. See id. at 451d-456e ("If, then, we are to use the women for the same things
as the men, we must also teach them the same things. . . . [T]he contrast with present custom
would make much in our proposals look ridiculous if our words are to be realized in
fact.... Women of this kind [that is, guardians], then, must be selected to cohabit with men of
this kind and to serve with them as guardians since they are capable of it and akin by nature.");
see generally FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS OF PLATO (Nancy Tuana ed. 1994) (noting scholarly
debates between those that view Plato as being ahead of his time for advocating gender equality
and those that believe the totality of Plato's work does not endorse equality).
100. 158 CONG. REc. S1,828 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2012) (statement of Sen. Mary Landrieu)
("[W]e have to write these rules fairly or it is the poor people, it is the middle class, it is the
people who didn't go to the Ivy League schools . . . who are going to be led down the Primrose
path.... [Liet's give them, the investor, protections they deserve.").
101. Burkett, supra note 8, at 96.
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fraudulent secondary transactions."1 0 2  For instance, one famous
approach, the "pump-and-dump" scheme,103  sought to generate
widespread interest in small companies with "thin capitalization, low
share prices, and little to no analyst coverage" in order to inflate the
stock price.10 4  Once the stock price rose, the promoters would sell
their shares prior to other investors' discovery of the artificial inflation
of the stock price. 105
As the Commission has recognized, the lessons learned from
the Rule 504 experiment are helpful in crafting a regulatory approach
to crowdfunding investment because of the similarities between
crowdfunding companies and the companies whose stock was used to
defraud investors under Rule 504:
The Commission's rules previously included an exemption, Rule 504, which allowed a
public offering to investors (including non-accredited investors) for securities offerings of
up to $1 million, with no prescribed disclosures .. . . In 1999, that exemption was
significantly revised due in part to investor protection concerns about fraud in the
market .... In assessing any possible exemption for crowdfunding, it would be
important to consider this experience and build in investor protections to address the
issues created under the prior exemption.
10 6
In this regard, one prominent crowdfunding-investment article extols
the disclosure-based regulatory approach, arguing that "[e]xposing
unsophisticated investors to risky investments without adequate
disclosure unduly sacrifices investor-protection goals to the perceived
need to lower the disclosure barriers for small businesses."1 0 7 The
article concludes that, "Hopefully, the new crowdfunding exemption as
implemented by the [Commission] will provide sufficiently meaningful
disclosure so that investors receive the protection they both need and
deserve."08 The article references the Rule 504 experience to support
the argument that required disclosures are necessary to protect
crowdfunders, noting that under the JOBS Act, crowdfunding is
102. Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, the "Seed Capital" Exemption, Securities Act
Release No. 7541 (May 21, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-7541.htm.
103. Hazen, supra note 8, at 1748 (footnotes omitted).
104. Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, supra note 102.
105. Hazen, supra note 8, at 1748 (footnotes omitted).
106. Crowdfunding: Connecting Investors and Job Creators: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on TARP, Financial Services, and Bailouts of Public and Private Programs of the
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 112th Cong. 11 (2011) (statement of
Meredith B. Cross, Director, Division of Corporation Finance, Securities and Exchange
Commission); see also Bradford, supra note 8, at 105 ("The SEC's experience when it eased the
requirements of the Rule 504 small offering exemption in the 1990s also illustrates the potential
fraud associated with unregulated small offerings.").
107. Hazen, supra note 8, at 1767.
108. Id. at 1769. "Only time will tell whether the express disclosure requirements
in . . . [the Act] will be sufficient to provide meaningful investor protection. If not, the SEC can
correct the situation" through its implementing regulations. Id. at 1765 (footnote omitted).
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conditioned on mandated disclosures that gives [sic] investors the opportunity to
evaluate the merits of the investment. . . . [Tihese disclosures are required in the form
of an offering circular that is sufficient to trigger a section 12(a)(2) claim should the
disclosures be materially deficient. Anything short of this would permit a general
solicitation of investors regardless of sophistication and would trigger the types of
abuses that led to the 1999 revision of the Rule 504 exemption.1 09
Undoubtedly, a crowdfunding exemption that ignored the lessons
gleaned from Rule 504's failures prior to the 1999 revisions would
have been counterproductive, but it is also important not to
over-emphasize the power of disclosure alone to protect crowdfunding
investors.
Disclosure can be helpful in pursuing legal claims for material
misstatements or omissions,110 but its effectiveness in helping
investors, especially unsophisticated ones, judge the quality of
securities offerings is questionable, as discussed in Part III.B.
Further, the historical lesson from Rule 504 is not simply that without
disclosures unsophisticated investors are vulnerable to fraudulent
investment schemes. Rather, the broader lesson is that
unsophisticated investors need protection (not necessarily in the form
of disclosures) when investing in unregistered securities.
In fact, when the Commission amended Rule 504, it did not add
a disclosure requirement to the exemption. Rather, the amendment
required issuers to have a preexisting relationship with purchasers
(i.e., friends and family), thereby eliminating public solicitation (over
the Internet or otherwise)11' and relying on investors' preexisting
relationships to decrease the risk of fraud.112 Importantly, Rule 504
still does not require any disclosures to unsophisticated investors.
Instead, a different mechanism of protecting unsophisticated investors
was applied as the Commission eliminated public solicitations under
Rule 504 through the requirement of a preexisting relationship.
Therefore, the Rule 504 example does not teach that required
disclosures are the necessary tool to protect unsophisticated investors;
more precisely, it shows that unregistered securities offerings to
unsophisticated investors should include investor protections, in one
form or another.
109. Id. at 1769 (footnote omitted).
110. Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2006). The crowdfunding
provisions of the Act expressly include Section 12 liability for crowdfunding communications, as
the Supreme Court had limited Section 12(a)(2) liability to public offerings in Gustafson v. Alloyd
Co., 513 U.S. 561, 578-84 (1995).
111. Public solicitation over the Internet is inherent in crowdfunding investment and
thus cannot be removed like it was from Rule 504.
112. The amendment to Rule 504, 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1), prohibited general
solicitations except in the narrow case where a company offers stock under a state law
exemption, such as an intra-state offering, and complies with state law disclosure requirements.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1) (2011).
605
VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW
Particularly where disclosure is complex, formalistic, and
difficult to understand, disclosure is unlikely to compel retail investors
to seek their own protections.113 This is likely to be especially true in
the case of widely dispersed crowdfunders who lack an efficient
mechanism to negotiate contractual terms. Therefore, continuing to
apply a purely disclosure-based philosophy to crowdfunding
investment is flawed because it places excessive trust in the power of
disclosure to protect crowdfunding investors.
B. Securities Regulation: Disclosure vs. Merit Review
The US federal securities regulatory regime, like that of most if
not all other advanced economies, adheres to the disclosure-based
philosophy of securities regulation.1 14  Due to the risks that
crowdfunding investment presents for retail investors, however, the
competing philosophy of merit review offers insights that highlight the
theoretical flaws of the crowdfunding provisions of the JOBS Act.
Even while appreciating the insights from the merit-review
philosophy, though, this Article does not suggest replacing the
disclosure-based system with a merit-review approach, as explained at
the end of this Part.
The merit-review and disclosure philosophies differ as follows:
Under the disclosure-based model, securities regulation is effected, not by prohibition or
direct intervention, but by requiring adequate disclosure with respect to the transaction
and imposing sanctions for false or misleading statements. By contra[s]t, the
merits-based model goes beyond the mere requirement of information disclosure to
include merit-review by the state of the efficacy and equity of the securities being
offered. 115
The disclosure model, then, typically results in issuers preparing
extensive reports (e.g., prospectuses, private placement memoranda,
etc.) that describe both the general risks of investing as well as the
specific risks of the issuer's company and business. Justice Brandeis
famously captured its rationale of exposing falsehood through
transparency with his enduring description: "Sunlight is said to be the
best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman."116 An
important characteristic of the disclosure model is to provide either (1)
a basis for defrauded investors to recover from issuers that make
113. Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences
for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417, 431-43 (2003).
114. Robin Hui Huang, The Regulation of Securities Offerings in China: Reconsidering
the Merit Review Element in Light of the Global Financial Crisis, 41 H.K. L. J. 261, 272 (2011).
115. Id.
116. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(1914).
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misleading statements in, or omit material information from, their
disclosure documents, or (2) a shield for issuers to avoid liability for
investors' risky, yet informed decisions.17
The disclosure model, though, has its shortcomings,18 such as
"information overload[, which] raises doubts about the effectiveness of
the disclosure philosophy at the core of the federal securities laws,"11s
and has been under increased scrutiny after the capital markets'
collapse in 2008.120 The alternative model of merit review has
simultaneously received renewed attention. In summarizing the
historical antecedents of US securities laws, one commentator noted:
By adopting disclosure as the underlying philosophy of the federal securities laws, the
framers of that legislation put too much faith in the prudence of investors and the
self-policing mechanisms of the capital markets. As such, they passed up the
opportunity to exercise more meaningful control over the quality of issued securities by
a regime of merit regulation.12 1
Merit review focuses on "substantive standards"122 and "represents a
form of state 'paternalism' in that it replaces investors' value
judgments with those of the regulator with respect to the securities
and the issuing corporation."12 3  State "blue sky"1 24  securities
117. E.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from
Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 627,
627 (1996) ("When risky investments go wrong, brokers and customers may blame each other for
the misfortune. Courts and others resolving these disputes must then decide whether the broker
withheld information about the risk, or whether the customer knew about the risk and simply
made a bad decision.").
118. See, e.g., Huang, supra note 114, at 271-74; Daniel J. Morrissey, The Road Not
Taken: Rethinking Securities Regulation and the Case for Federal Merit Review, 44 U. RICH. L.
REV. 647, 677-88 (2010); Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The
Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 712 (2006).
119. Paredes, supra note 113, at 484-85.
120. E.g., Henry T. C. Hu, Too Complex To Depict? Innovation, "Pure Information," and
the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1607 (2012) (asserting that the
Commission's "disclosure philosophy and its longstanding implementation methodology . . . are
at the brink of metamorphosis" in part due to the complexity of contemporary financial products
that contributed to the market collapse in 2008, and suggesting increased use of technology to
provide market participants with disintermediated, pure information instead of disclosures
filtered through intermediaries, including issuers themselves).
121. Morrissey, supra note 118, at 649. The disclosure philosophy is more faithful to the
United States' emphasis on personal responsibility than the more paternalistic merit review
philosophy. See, e.g., Adam Benforado, Don't Blame Us: How Our Attributional Proclivities
Influence the Relationship between Americans, Business and Government, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL
BUS. L.J. 509 (2010) (describing, in the context of advertising, the United States' personal
responsibility ethic that tends to deemphasize corporate responsibility for shaping consumer
desires, notwithstanding the billions of dollars that companies spend to influence consumer
preferences).
122. Marianne M. Jennings, The Efficacy of Merit Review of Common Stock Offerings: Do
Regulators Know More than the Market?, 7 BYU J. PUB. L. 211, 218 (1993).
123. Huang, supra note 114, at 268; see also John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale,
Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 727-28 (2009)
607
VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW [Vol. 15:3:583
regulations have historically focused on merit review, and in the 1930s
the debate about which model was most appropriate for federal
regulation was still alive: the "original draft of [the Securities Act of
1933], following the states' example, was premised on a merit
standard," though the final draft adopted the disclosure-based
philosophy. 125
Merit review generally requires the issuer to submit
information to regulators for substantive review and approval in
advance of offering securities to investors.126 As such, merit review
involves a regulator's qualitative assessment of the offering.127 Merit
review aims to detect and prevent fraudulent or ill-advised offerings
before they occur in order to avoid expensive litigation after investors
suffer losses.128  In contrast, under the disclosure model, the
Commission challenges issuers engaging in a public offering to provide
more comprehensive disclosures and seeks clarification of the issuer's
statements, but it refrains from judging the substantive quality of the
offering. 129
One way to highlight the difference between merit review and
disclosure is to consider a hypothetical example of how securities
regulators under a merit review system would have treated "the
opaque and exotic derivative instruments" that were sold prior to the
("[The] uniquely high level of individual ownership [of securities in the United States] implies
both a need for some paternalism in securities regulation and the inevitability that there will be
a political demand for strong enforcement.").
124. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917) (showing an early use of the term
"blue sky" in relation to state securities laws: "The name that is given to the law indicates the
evil at which it is aimed; that is, to use the language of a cited case, 'speculative schemes which
have no more basis than so many feet of 'blue sky"').
125. Morrissey, supra note 118, at 677-80.
126. Jennings, supra note 122, at 214-23.
127. Id.
128. Arguing, to no avail, that the Act should not preempt state securities laws:
States [need] to get "under the hood" of an offering to make sure that it is what it says
it is.... One of the fundamental tenets of [disclosure-based] securities law is that an
investor is protected when the seller of securities is required to disclose sufficient
information so that an investor can make an informed decision. [However, p]ost-sale
antifraud remedies provide little comfort to an investor who has lost a significant sum
of money that is unrecoverable. [Therefore, a]ny effort to remove or weaken the
up-front registration and disclosure process should not happen without adequate
alternative safeguards.
Letter from Jack E. Herstein, President, N. Am. Sec. Adm'rs Ass'n, Inc., to John Boehner,
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives and Nancy Pelosi, Minority Leader, U.S. House of
Representatives (Nov. 3, 2011), available at http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/
NASAA-Letter-on-HR-2930.pdf.
129. E.g., Manning G. Warren III, Legitimacy in the Securities Industry: The Role of
Merit Regulation, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 129, 129-31 (1987) (citing an example where the
Commission was "frustrated by its limitations" under the disclosure-based regime in reviewing
"only for compliance with disclosure standards" the prospectus filed by a company whose CEO
had a history of securities law violations).
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collapse of financial markets in 2008.130 Under merit review, a federal
agency would have had "the power to prohibit the sale of securities not
based on 'sound principles'. . . [, and theoretically] would then have
found that the [collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) popularized in
the bubble leading up to the 2008 collapse] were tantamount to a
Ponzi scheme since they would only have value in a real estate market
whose escalation never ended."131  Because such an eternally
optimistic assumption is not a "sound principle," the federal agency
would have been empowered to stop the sale of the CDOs or mandate
substantive changes in the financial instruments.132
In contrast, the disclosure philosophy does not ask whether a
security is based on sound principles, deferring instead to the market
to judge the quality of issuances, so long as the issuer has provided
sufficient disclosures (or disclaimers).133  Hence, the theoretical
justification for the more paternalistic merit review is evident from
the failings of the disclosure-based approach in the area of complex
financial products that retail investors do not fully understand:
[D]isclosure documents like prospectuses are close to impenetrable for many
investors. When faced with complex structured products, investors are more likely to
use emotional responses ... [; thus,] risk disclosure does not necessarily lead to risk
awareness on the part of average investors [, which] casts doubt on the effectiveness
of disclosure-based regulation . . . [particularly because] even in the [United States],
retail investors have limited knowledge of finance and are not capable of fully
understanding disclosures. 134
In sum, "merits-based regulation may be appropriate for
emerging markets where there are a large number of unsophisticated
retail investors, and which lack professional analysts."13 5
Crowdfunding investment, therefore, could be considered a prime
example of when the more paternalistic securities-regulation
philosophy of merit review is appropriate. Crowdfunding investment
130. Morrissey, supra note 118, at 683.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. ("Although almost all [CDOs] were sold as unregistered, exempt securities, it is
hard to see how our current regime of requiring mere disclosure would have forestalled their
issuance or protected investors who eagerly snapped them up." (footnote omitted)).
134. Huang, supra note 114, at 272-75 (footnote omitted); see also Bradford, supra note
8, at 109-12 (discussing the low levels of financial literacy in the United States); Willis, supra
note 118, at 753-77 (noting that "the majority of Americans are unaware of their lack of financial
literacy" and discussing the role of emotion in decision making as one justification for consumer
regulatory protections); see generally Barry P. McDonald, Campaign Finance Regulation and the
Marketplace of Emotions, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 395 (2009) (observing that neuroscience research
reveals the influence of emotion on rational decision making, and thus suggesting that courts
consider regulating emotionally charged political rhetoric more vigorously, that is,
paternalistically).
135. Huang, supra note 114, at 278-79.
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is characterized by most, if not all, of the elements described above:
emotion (due to the excitement of innovative ideas with the potential
to produce astronomical profits), unsophisticated investors, an
emerging market, complexity, and few professional analysts.13 6
Despite how well crowdfunding investment fits the theoretical
justifications of merit review, this Article does not argue for
replacement of the disclosure-based regulatory regime with a
merit-review system. Even advocates of merit review believe
"[s]kepticism is warranted" in using a merit-review system for federal
securities regulation.137 Merit-review filings can create costly delays
and introduce additional transaction costs to securities offerings,138
and it would be unrealistic and counterproductive for the Commission,
whose "limited resources are well-known,"139 to assume the
responsibility of merit review. In addition, a merit-review system is
prone to creating market inefficiencies by supplanting the judgment of
the market with that of regulators.140 Further, the crowdfunding
provisions of the Act already preempt state merit-review filings.14 1
Nonetheless, the theoretical insights of merit review are
instructive for protecting crowdfunders in ways that go beyond
exclusive reliance on disclosure. As explained in Part V, this Article
proposes a third way, one of "qualitative mandates," that borrows the
best of the merit-based approach (i.e., "meaningful control over the
136. Though professional analysts might give attention to crowdfunding securities
offerings, information about many start-up companies is speculative and unproven because the
companies are entering new markets or introducing new products or technologies; therefore, the
quality of the information available to professional analysts, and the value of the analysts'
reviews, are questionable. For example:
Small companies . . . present investors with the greatest risk of getting stuck with a
lemon. The stocks of small companies provide much potential return-who would not
want to get in on the ground floor with a Microsoft or Dell-but little is typically
known about these companies. Large, publicly traded companies with many years of
reporting experience have several investment analysts following them.
Stephen J. Choi, Gatekeepers and the Internet: Rethinking the Regulation of Small Business
Capital Formation, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 27, 31 (1998); Letter from Mary L. Schapiro,
Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, to Darrell E. Issa, Chairman, Comm. on Oversight &
Gov't Reform, U.S. House of Representatives 24 (Apr. 6, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/schapiro-issa-letter-040611.pdf ("Startups are different from the typical company in
which financial institutions and institutional investors invest because startups are characterized
by uncertainty and information asymmetry . . . and often have high levels of intangible assets,
making it difficult for institutional investors . . . to value them accurately.").
137. Morrissey, supra note 118, at 685.
138. Jennings, supra note 122, at 240.
139. Morrissey, supra note 118, at 685.
140. Huang, supra note 114, at 268-70; Jennings, supra note 122, at 242.
141. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 305, 126 Stat. 306
(2012) (preempting state securities laws, except for anti-fraud enforcement and notice filings in
the state where the company's principal place of business is located or the state where 50 percent
or more of the purchasers of the crowdfunded securities are residents).
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quality of issued securities")1 42 and applies it within the framework of
the disclosure-based system.
IV. VENTURE CAPITALIST ELITES AND THE MASSES
Crowdfunding brings the masses of everyday retail investors
into what historically has been the nearly exclusive domain of venture
capitalists and other wealthy investors.143 This is a paradigm change
for securities regulation because in general, securities "regulatory
requirements favor those with connections to high-net-worth
individuals, wealthy friends and family members; those lacking
connections have a much tougher time raising funds. . .. [It is] 'a
rather undemocratic process."'14 4  Before the JOBS Act, broad
restrictions on general solicitations prior to a public offering usually
resulted in unsophisticated investors having the opportunity to invest
in start-up companies only after the companies were successful
enough to engage in a public offering.145
Investing in start-up companies in their infancy and
development stages is a high-risk, high-reward game in which
sophisticated venture capitalists have made legendary profits while
also refining multiple strategies to protect their investments.146
Crowdfunding investment could create competition for venture
capitalists, and especially angel investors, in what was previously a
near monopoly for the wealthy, but it is unlikely to threaten venture
capitalists because successful start-up companies will often need more
142. Morrissey, supra note 118, at 649 (emphasis added).
143. Pope, supra note 8, at 984 (observing that prior to the Act, securities rules related to
investing in start-up companies created "a relatively closed [process,] ... providing investment
opportunities to venture capital firms and high net worth individuals and financing
opportunities to select entrepreneurs").
144. Deborah L. Cohen, Fund for All: 'Crowdfunding' Supporters Look to Congress to
Lighten Regulatory Load, ABA J. (Mar. 1, 2012, 4:20 AM), www.abajournal.com/magazine/
article/fund for all crowdfunding-supporters0looktoCongressto_1ightenregulatory (quoting
Michael W. Schley, a Minneapolis securities lawyer).
145. Title II of the JOBS Act removes the restriction on general solicitations from Rule
506 offerings while still requiring that all purchasers be accredited investors. Jumpstart Our
Business Startups Act § 201. Prior to the Act's amendment o Rule 506, securities offerings to
accredited investors over the Internet under Rule 506 were permitted only if issuers were careful
to avoid unaccredited investors and a general solicitation. See, e.g., Jonas A. Marson, Comment,
Surfing the Web for Capital: The Regulation of Internet Securities Offerings, 16 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 281, 284-88 (2000); Lisa A. Mondschein, Note, The Solicitation
and Marketing of Securities Offerings Through the Internet, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 185, 208 (1999)
(describing the two requirements as a questionnaire to verify accredited investors status and a
password-protected website).
146. See, e.g., Elizabeth Cosenza, Co-Invest at Your Own Risk: An Exploration of
Potential Remedial Theories for Breaches of Rights of First Refusal in the Venture Capital
Context, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 87, 94 (2005).
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investment than the Act's $1 million annual cap.14 7  In addition,
without adequate protections, crowdfunding investors will be easy
prey for sophisticated venture capitalists. The latter point has been
neglected in crowdfunding investment scholarship and the
crowdfunding provisions of the Act.
A. Vertical and Horizontal Risks
The blind spot of overlooking the potential conflicts between
crowdfunding investors and venture capitalists may be a product of
the "implicit dichotomy of the corporation [that] exists in legal
scholarship. On one side of the dichotomy rests the publicly held
corporation suffering from a significant conflict of interest between its
managers and dispersed shareholders; on the other side, the closely
held corporation plagued by intershareholder conflict." 148  But
analyzing venture capital investing "reveals that start-up companies
are indeed plagued by both vertical agency problems between
investors and managers and horizontal agency problems among
[venture capital] investors themselves."1 4 9 Unfortunately, both the
crowdfunding provisions of the JOBS Act and crowdfunding
scholarship have neglected horizontal agency problems in
crowdfunding investment, despite horizontal concerns being a primary
risk for crowdfunding investors.
The focus on vertical agency problems in the Act is evident in
the overriding concern with disclosures from the company's
management. Even the clunky, full title of the crowdfunding
provisions of the Act (the Capital Raising Online While Deterring
Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act of 2012)150 is emblematic of
the emphasis on the vertical agency concerns of fraud and disclosure
in crowdfunding investment. In addition, Professor Bradford's
comprehensive crowdfunding-investment article, for example, takes a
vertical agency perspective in discussing the risks to crowdfunders of
investing in start-up companies, noting that "the entrepreneur holds
all the cards. Investors have little information about what is to come
and little control over what the entrepreneur does. This presents
entrepreneurs with opportunities for self-dealing, excessive
compensation, misuse of corporate opportunities, and dilution of
147. Ryan Caldbeck, Why Crowdfunding Is Disruptive to Angels, But Not to VCs,
VENTURE BEAT (Nov. 22, 2012), http://venturebeat.com/2012/11/22/why-crowdfunding-is-
disruptive-to-angels-but-not-to-vcs.
148. Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of
the Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 37 (2006).
149. Id. at 37, 40-41.
150. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 301.
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investors' interests . . . ."151 The article's focus on vertical risks is also
apparent when it recognizes that venture capitalists have developed
strategies to "constrain self-dealing, opportunistic behavior by the
entrepreneur"1 5 2 but remains silent on the horizontal threats that
venture capitalists (and soon, crowdfunders) face from other investors
when a start-up company is successful.153 Venture capitalists do use
numerous techniques to constrain entrepreneurs in order to manage
vertical risks, but as discussed below, venture capitalists also design
these techniques to protect against the horizontal risks that other
investors pose.
B. Downside and Upside Risks
The arrival of subsequent investors, such as venture
capitalists, can temper the upside potential of crowdfunders'
ground-floor investment in a successful start-up company. Therefore,
neglecting horizontal risks can lead to an overly optimistic view of the
upside potential of crowdfunding investment. An absence of
appropriate venture capital protections can result in significantly
lower financial returns on an early-stage crowdfunding investment in
a successful start-up company.
For instance, in comparing the equity and non-equity models of
crowdfunding, Professor Bradford's article concludes that
contributions under the other models "are subject to the same risk of
loss as crowdfunded securities, but do not offer the upside potential of
a securities investment. Allowing crowdfunding entrepreneurs to sell
securities would, therefore, be a net gain to investors, increasing the
possibility of gains without any increase in the risk."154
Unfortunately, where there is upside potential, there is also increased
risk for crowdfunders because promising investment opportunities in
start-up companies attract competing investors, who are often
sophisticated venture capitalists. Another crowdfunding article,
though, expresses a similarly rosy outlook that, "If the [crowdfunded]
company continues to grow, early investors should reap some financial
rewards for their investments . . . ."155 It is possible that early
crowdfunding investors will reap financial rewards, but as explained
151. Bradford, supra note 8, at 107.
152. Id.
153. E.g., id. at 9 (noting that "[c]rowdfunding exposes relatively unsophisticated
investors to the greater risks associated with small business offerings-illiquidity, fraud,
business failure, and entrepreneurial self-dealing" but stopping short of discussing upside,
horizontal risks directly).
154. Id. at 105.
155. Pope, supra note 8, at 985.
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below, the value of crowdfunders' investments in start-up companies
can be negligible without investor protections against horizontal
risks.15 6 As unfortunate as it would be for a crowdfunding investor to
lose money to a fraudulent, failed, or mismanaged start-up company,
it would be at least as painful, if not more so, for a crowdfunder to
invest in a start-up venture that becomes a multi-million (or -billion)
dollar enterprise and not receive a fair share of the profits while other
investors enjoy the gains.
The Social Network portrays this risk poignantly in its
depiction of Eduardo Saverin's quest to recover his ownership interest
in Facebook through no-holds-barred litigation. Though Mr. Saverin's
struggles could be viewed through the vertical agency lens that gives
priority to his dispute with company management (i.e., Mark
Zuckerberg), his struggles were directly related to the horizontal
agency problem that arose in the movie when Facebook sold equity
interests to other investors-first to venture capitalist Peter Thiel and
then, in a separate round of financing, to Case Equity.15 7 Because Mr.
Saverin apparently lacked the investor protections that venture
capitalists typically negotiate, his original 30 percent ownership
interest was diluted down to less than 1 percent when Case Equity
invested in the second round of Facebook's venture capital financing,
even though the other existing investors' ownership interests were, at
most, minimally diluted. 58
Similar to Mr. Saverin's failure to negotiate necessary investor
protections, individual crowdfunding investors have little ability to
negotiate the types of protections against horizontal risks that venture
capitalists require. As Professor Bradford's article argues, albeit in
connection with a discussion of vertical agency risks,
156. Former Chairman Schapiro's comments are typical, and though they are accurate,
they are incomplete because they do not address horizontal agency risks. Schapiro, supra note
136 (discussing crowdfunding investment and noting that venture capitalists "have developed
certain mechanisms that allow them to successfully manage the risks involved in investing in
[start-up companies]. Often [venture capitalists] are active investors that vigorously monitor
their investments and participate in the day-to-day operations of their investments, and they
frequently are value-added investors because ... they furnish business expertise . . . .").
157. In the movie, after the first round of investment led by Peter Thiel, a second round
of investment occurred when Case Equity made "an investment offer that was hard to turn
down." Facebook's counsel stated to Mr. Saverin that "we had some new investors that have
come in" and proceeded to show Mr. Saverin the contracts that would dilute Mr. Saverin's
ownership share down to 0.03 percent while not diluting the ownership share of the other
existing stockholders. THE SOcIAL NETWORK, supra note 1.
158. Mr. Saverin eventually settled his lawsuit against Facebook and became a
billionaire through his Facebook shares, see Eduardo Saverin, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/
profile/eduardo-saverin (last visited Nov. 11, 2012), but it would have been better for him, and it
will be better for crowdfunders, to avoid litigation through protections against horizontal risks
that arise in follow-on rounds of financing.
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Most crowdfunding investors will not have the sophistication to understand the need for
or benefits of control rights or protective covenants. Even if they were sophisticated
enough to seek such protection, it is unclear how they would negotiate for it, or whether
it would be worth their effort. The small amount invested by each crowdfunding
investor and the remote, impersonal nature of crowdfunding preclude any meaningful
negotiations. 159
Especially due to the high per-person investment caps under the
Act,160 obtaining economic protections against horizontal risks is
worth the effort because, without them, the upside to crowdfunders
can end up being little more than pennies on the dollar even if the
crowdfunded company is wildly successful. 161
As crowdfunders step into the shoes of venture-capital
investors, the areas of most potential vulnerability for crowdfunders
under the horizontal-agency paradigm will track the primary risks of
venture-capital investing: "Although interinvestor conflicts might
arise in a variety of contexts, the two that appear to play the largest
role in [venture capital] contracts are those relating to a company's
ultimate exit strategy and a company's future financing."162
Accordingly, protections relating to the economic risks posed by
start-up companies' follow-on rounds of financing and potential exit
events are addressed below.
1. Financing Rounds, Exits, and Protecting Crowdfunders
Through staged financing, venture capitalists exert "enormous
control over portfolio companies by forcing them to raise capital
repeatedly" through multiple rounds of financing in which venture
capitalists invest "only enough money to allow [the company] to
progress to the next milestone in its business plan."'63 If a start-up
company that receives crowdfunding investment succeeds, it will often
need additional investments that could easily exceed the $1 million
annual cap under the JOBS Act. In fact, one of the specific purposes
of crowdfunding investment is to "give entrepreneurs an opportunity
159. Bradford, supra note 8, at 107 (internal citations omitted).
160. Written prior to the JOBS Act, Bradford's article argued for a significantly lower
per-person investment cap than the actual caps under the Act. Bradford, supra note 8, at 149.
161. Describing an expectation that the Commission provide investor protections against
horizontal risks:
Another essential issue is ... dilution.... Those are folks who get in on the front end
and think: I got in on this idea early. I am going to benefit from having made this
effort, and find out later a bigger investor came in and the stock was diluted in a
fashion in which they are basically written out of their share of the ownership. So the
Senate bill directs the SEC to provide investor protections in this area.
158 CONG. REC. S1,887 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2012) (statement of Sen. Jeffrey Merkley).
162. Bartlett, supra note 148, at 71 (footnote omitted).
163. D. Gordon Smith, Team Production in Venture Capital Investing, 24 J. CORP. L. 949,
952 (1999).
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to travel further down the development path by taking incremental
steps before approaching venture capitalists."16 4 This is consistent
both with venture capitalists' frequent preference to invest in growing
companies that have successfully moved beyond the perilous
early-start-up stage and with typical venture capital investment
amounts that average between $2 million and $10 million.165
When growing crowdfunded companies seek additional
financing from other investors, such as venture capitalists,166 the
arrival of the new investors can severely impact the existing
stockholders (i.e., crowdfunders). Two of the most pronounced and
interrelated effects include (1) dilution of crowdfunders' ownership
percentages when the company issues new shares to new investors,
similar to how The Social Network portrayed the substantial dilutive
impact of Case Equity's new investment on Eduardo Saverin's
ownership interest;167 and (2) exclusion of crowdfunders when other
stockholders resell (or the company sells) shares to new investors.
a. Price-Based Anti-Dilution Protection
Crowdfunders, like venture capitalists, are at risk of dilution in
two ways. The first, as discussed in this subsection, is based on the
relative price of the new securities issued in subsequent financing
rounds. The second, discussed in the next subsection, relates to
maintaining a conversion ratio that adjusts to issuances of additional
securities. Venture capitalists include the contractual protections
discussed in these two subsections to guard against both types of
dilutive risks, and crowdfunders should enjoy similar protections.
Dilution results when a company issues new shares to new
investors because, with an increase in the total number of outstanding
shares, existing shareholders own a lower percentage of the company's
total shares.168 This may not be problematic from an economic
164. Pope, supra note 8, at 985.
165. Bradford, supra note 8, at 102 (footnote omitted).
166. Further research could investigate the effect that a round of crowdfunding financing
has on subsequent financings, including whether crowdfunders make it more or less likely for
venture capitalists to invest, and what effect crowdfunders have on the terms of a venture
capitalist's investment.
167. Because the cofounder of one crowdfunding investment website might be correct-"I
absolutely think that a company funded on our platform could be the next Facebook"-it is
imperative that crowdfunders be protected from the risks posed by staged financing and exit
events. Carl Franzen, One Company Ready to "Crowdfund" After JOBS Act: Rock the Post,
TALKING POINTS MEMO (Apr. 6, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://idealab.talkingpointsmemo.com/2012/
04/one-company-ready-to-crowdfund-after-jobs-act-rock-the-post.php (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting the cofounder and chief operating officer of Rock the Post).
168. Mira Ganor, The Power to Issue Stock, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 701, 702 (2011) ("A
direct outcome of any issuance of shares is the dilution of existing shareholders. . . . Voting
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perspective if the company issues the new shares at a higher price per
share than what the existing investors paid (an "up-round") because
the value of the existing investors' positions does not decrease (i.e.,
they own a smaller percentage, but of a larger pie).169
But dilution is problematic from an economic perspective if the
new shares are sold for a lower price per share than what the existing
stockholders paid (a "down-round").170 In a down-round, existing
stockholders will own a lower percentage of a less valuable company,
unless they have down-round anti-dilution protection to mitigate the
dilutive effect.171 Venture capitalists protect themselves against the
economic risks of down-rounds through price-based anti-dilution
provisions in their preferred-stock-investment contracts.172
In a down-round, the issuance of new stock "can easily reach
into the hundreds of millions of shares . . . leaving common
stockholders and unprotected investors with truly worthless stock."173
Down-round anti-dilution protection, though, "diminishes the dilutive
effect ... by increasing, upon the issuance of the lower-priced
[preferred] stock, the ratio at which each share of the . . . higher-priced
preferred stock converts into common stock."17 4 Thus, in accordance
with the terms of the anti-dilution provision, existing preferred
stockholders obtain the right to convert their preferred stock into more
shares of common stock than they otherwise would.75 Depending on
dilution can occur even if the value of the shares of the existing shareholder remains the
same . . . .").
169. As Bartlett explains:
Ordinarily, a preferred stockholder will expect its ownership . . . to be diluted when
the company issues stock to new investors at a higher price than the preferred
stockholder paid for its own shares. Although its percentage ownership . . . will be
diminished, the value of the stockholder's ownership interest will generally be the
same or greater . .. as the company will have a greater aggregate valuation.
Robert P. Bartlett, III, Understanding Price-Based Antidilution Protection: Five Principles to
Apply When Negotiating a Down-Round Financing, 59 BUs. LAw. 23, 24-25 (2003).
170. A down-round does not necessarily imply that a company is failing. Company
valuations vary for numerous reasons, and the risk of a down-round is particularly prevalent
when the first round overvalues the company, which is foreseeable when inexperienced
crowdfunders invest in unproven companies. See, e.g., Startup Funding-Startup Valuation at
the Friends and Family Round, ANGELBLOG, http://www.angelblog.net/Startup-Funding-
Valuation at theFriends andFamilyRound.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2012) (observing that
"[o]ver-valuation is one of the most common structural problems" entrepreneurs and
inexperienced early-stage investors make when financing start-up ventures, due in part to "being
wildly optimistic" and in part to the lack of "any objective way to do a fair startup valuation").
171. Bartlett, supra note 169, at 24-25.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 30.
174. Bartlett, supra note 148, at 79-80.
175. See id. at 81.
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the specific anti-dilution formula used, the result is less dilution for
the preferred stockholder, though some dilution may still occur.176
In practice, another effect of down-round anti-dilution
protection is "generally [to] require the new investor to negotiate with
the existing investors regarding the waiver of all or part of their
antidilution protection."'7 7 In crowdfunding investment, this would be
a fair result for crowdfunders because new investors could still invest
in follow-on rounds of financing, but, like venture capitalists,
crowdfunders would have price-based anti-dilution protection.
Therefore, issuance of new shares would not excessively dilute the
value of crowdfunders' investments without their knowledge and
consent. Without price-based anti-dilution protection, crowdfunders
would be in a similar position to managers of start-up companies but
with a fundamental distinction.78 Down-round anti-dilution is an
acceptable risk for managers because managers have a voice in the
negotiation with follow-on investors, as they decide whether and on
what terms to issue new shares to new investors.
But this risk is unacceptable for crowdfunders (or venture
capitalists) because without down-round anti-dilution protection, the
value of existing investments can be reduced to next to nothing in
subsequent rounds of financing, without existing investors having any
control over (or even knowledge of) their dispossession. Absent
price-based anti-dilution protection, crowdfunders will likely find
themselves in Mr. Saverin's position before his successful litigation:
pushed out of a once promising ground-floor investment in a
successful start-up company. Therefore, crowdfunders, like venture
capitalists, need down-round anti-dilution protection against the
horizontal risks that subsequent investors represent.
b. Shares-Based Anti-Dilution Protection
Another dilutive risk is that the company will issue additional
shares of common stock, either through a stock split or a stock
dividend, potentially resulting in shares-based dilution of convertible
preferred stock. Therefore, crowdfunders, like venture capitalists,
need standard contractual protection against shares-based dilution.
176. See Dana M. Warren, Venture Capital Investment: Status and Trends, 6 OHIO ST.
ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 505, 519 (2011) (indicating that full ratchet price anti-dilution
protection, which eliminates the effect of dilution, is less common than a weighted average
formula, which lessens the effect of dilution).
177. Bartlett, supra note 169, at 30.
178. See id. at 31 ("[A] principle effect of antidilution protection is to increase the dilution
of a down-round financing on common stockholders, such as a company's management and
employees.").
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Absent this protection, crowdfunders' ownership interests will be
diluted when the company issues additional shares of common stock
because crowdfunders' preferred stock will convert into a lower
percentage ownership of the company's common stock.17 9 Unlike the
price-based dilution described in the preceding subsection,
shares-based dilution can occur at any time and is not tied to an
up-round or down-round. 180
For example, crowdfunders could hold one hundred shares of
preferred stock convertible on a one-for-one basis into one hundred
shares of common stock. If there are one hundred shares of common
stock outstanding, and the common shares are split by a five-for-one
ratio, then the one hundred shares of common stock outstanding will
become five hundred. Without a corresponding adjustment to
crowdfunders' preferred stock conversion ratio, though, the preferred
stock will still convert into only one hundred shares of common stock.
Thus, before the stock split, crowdfunders could have converted into
common stock and owned a 50 percent interest in the company (one
hundred of two hundred total shares). But after the split,
crowdfunders would own only a 16.7 percent interest on an
as-converted basis (one hundred of six hundred total shares).
Protection against this structural risk is so essential that all
crowdfunding investments in preferred stock should include
shares-based dilution protection. 181 Inexperienced crowdfunding
investors, however, understandably might be unaware of this nuance
in standard venture capital transactions. Therefore, as described in
Part V, crowdfunding statutes and regulations should help
crowdfunders avoid the possibility of the serious error of omitting
shares-based anti-dilution protection.
c. Tag-Along Rights
Tag-along, or co-sale, rights are another technique venture
capitalists use for protection in subsequent financings. Tag-along
rights help venture capitalists, and they should also help
crowdfunders, avoid being excluded from a profitable exit event.18 2
179. See Warren, supra note 176, at 520 (describing how shares-based ilution reduces
the ownership percentage of preferred stockholders unless the preferred stock's conversion ratio
is adjusted).
180. Id. (explaining that shares-based dilution is "unrelated to relative transaction
pricing").
181. Id. at 520-21 (noting that shares-based anti-dilution protection "should appear, and
absent serious error does, in every venture capital preferred stock").
182. See David E. Brown, Jr. et al., Strategic Alliances: Why, How, and What to Watch
For, 3 N.C. BANKING INST. 57, 91 (1999) (describing co-sale rights as a helpful strategy for an
investor "concerned about remaining trapped in its minority investment"); Eugene Kim,
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Apart from an initial public offering (IPO), a successful exit event for
early-stage investors often comes through a private sale or merger.183
Venture capitalists, especially those holding a minority ownership
interest in the company, protect themselves from the risks of private
sales by insisting on tag-along rights to ensure they are not left out of
a profitable private transaction when another stockholder, especially a
majority owner, sells its shares. 184
Two straightforward scenarios show the importance of
tag-along rights, especially for minority investors, as individual
crowdfunders are likely to be. In the first, stockholders with a
majority ownership position (possibly including company founders and
managers) might sell a controlling interest in the company to a third
party, perhaps an investor or a strategic acquirer, in a private
transaction that includes a control premium in the sale price.185 In
another scenario, an investor might seek to exit its illiquid
investment1 86 through a private sale to another investor who hopes for
a future exit event at a higher valuation-prior to Facebook's IPO, for
Comment, Venture Capital Contracting under the Korean Commercial Code: Adopting U.S.
Techniques in South Korean Transactions, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 439, 468 (2004) ("[Tag-along
rights] can be an important investment exit strategy for venture investors owning a minority
stake in the investment when a substantial portion of the common stock held by the
entrepreneurs is being sold privately to an outside party.").
183. Christopher Gulinello, Engineering a Venture Capital Market and the Effects of
Government Control on Private Ordering: Lessons from the Taiwan Experience, 37 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REV. 845, 876 (2005) (listing private, or "secondary," sales as one of five common exit
strategies of venture capitalists).
184. Lawrence Cohen, Private Equity Portfolio Companies: Their Needs Today, in
REPRESENTING PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE CAPITAL BACKED PORTFOLIO COMPANIES 49, 55
(2010) (describing tag-along rights as requiring "a buyer of the private equity fund's shares to
offer the same price and terms for the management's [or other investors'] shares before the
private equity fund can sell its interest").
185. Maria Isabel Saez Lacave & Nuria Bermejo Gutierrez, Specific Investments,
Opportunism and Corporate Contracts: A Theory of Tag-Along and Drag-Along Clauses, 11 EUR.
BUS. ORG. L. REV. 423, 431 (2010) (noting that tag-along rights have the effect of forcing "the
shareholder with selling power to negotiate for" itself and minority investors because "the idea is
to force the conversion of a majority sale into a 100 per cent sale").
186. Venture capitalists have short time horizons on their investments and, depending
on how many years remain in a fund's lifecycle, some venture capitalists will be motivated to
seek a profitable exit event before others:
Because of the ten-year term of most funds, an early investor who has held an
investment for several years may face a structural incentive to exit at a time when a
company's later investors are not subject to these pressures. A company's earlier
investors may therefore be less willing to forego a low-value exit yielding a return on
investment, even if the investors believe the company could obtain a higher valuation
in the long term.
Bartlett, supra note 148, at 74.
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instance, there were hundreds of private transactions in Facebook's
stock. 187
Without tag-along rights, crowdfunders could lack the
opportunity to participate in these types of profitable private sales.s18
The risk is especially acute when a majority owner sells its interest
and receives a control premium.18 9 Without protection, crowdfunders
would be left to continue waiting for an IPO, which may never come,
in order to realize the value of their illiquid shares, even while other
investors sell their interests and take profits, including a control
premium in many cases. 190
With tag-along rights, however, qualified private transactions
could not occur unless crowdfunders also had the opportunity to
participate in the transactions by selling their shares at the same
price and on the same terms. Therefore, with tag-along rights,
crowdfunders would be left out of a profitable transaction only if they
chose to wait for a potentially more profitable transaction in the
future. Crowdfunding laws should provide crowdfunders this option
because, without it, crowdfunders will likely be frozen out of profitable
private transactions while more sophisticated investors or majority
investors cash out.
d. Preemptive Rights
Another way venture capitalists manage the risks that the
arrival of new investors pose is through preemptive rights. These
rights "allow the shareholders to participate in any issuance of shares
pro rata to their percentage holding" so existing shareholders can
avoid dilution of their ownership positions when the company issues
187. The Internet is helping to facilitate private transactions prior to an IPO, as
Facebook's example illustrates. Daniel Gross, Facebook's IPO Already Happened-Several
Months Ago on SecondMarket, YAHOO! FIN. (May 21, 2012, 9:44 AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/
blogs/daniel-gross/facebook-ipo-already-happened-several-months-ago-secondmarket-134457488.
html.
188. See M. Todd Henderson, Deconstructing Duff and Phelps, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1739,
1751 (2007) (observing that in private sales, absent contractual tag-along rights, there is no
requirement that "offers to buy stock ... be made to every shareholder on a pro rata basis").
189. See id. (arguing that, absent contractual tag-along rights, there is "no duty for the
majority to share . . . [the control] premium with the minority").
190. Prior to an IPO, all of the company's preferred shares customarily convert to
common stock. Venture capitalists negotiate veto rights over automatic conversion of their
shares (and thus, over the IPO itself) by requiring that the per-share IPO price equal or exceed
the per-share price the venture capitalist paid. See Bartlett, supra note 148, at 74-77 (discussing
price- and voting-based veto rights). Whether or not crowdfunders hold a veto right over an
unprofitable IPO, crowdfunders are much less likely to be left out of an IPO than a private sale,
which is why this Article emphasizes tag-along rights for private sales.
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shares to new investors.'9 ' As a simple example, a shareholder who
owns 1 percent of a company's stock would have the right to purchase
1 percent of any qualifying 92 new issuance of the company's shares,
thus maintaining a 1 percent ownership interest in the company.
Just as venture capitalists often require preemptive rights to
avoid being pushed out when new investors arrive, it is reasonable for
crowdfunders to enjoy this basic protection, too. Preemptive rights
were once mandatory in the United States and continue to be
mandatory in other jurisdictions.'19 If crowdfunders want (and have
the funds)194 to continue investing in a company that has follow-on
rounds of financing, they should not be barred from the opportunity to
maintain their percentage ownership solely 95 because they lacked the
sophistication or the bargaining power to negotiate what venture
capitalists customarily demand.96
V. QUALITATIVE PROTECTIONS FOR CROWDFUNDERS
To address the risks of venture-capital investing, neither a
pure disclosure-based regime nor a merit-review system will
realistically protect crowdfunders. Instead, a qualitative-mandates
approach is appropriate because it emphasizes the importance of
crowdfunders obtaining substantive investor protections (such as
contractual, statutory, or regulatory protective provisions) within the
existing disclosure-based regime. As such, a qualitative-mandates
191. Ganor, supra note 169, at 706.
192. For example, issuing stock to employees typically does not trigger preemptive
rights.
193. Ganor, supra note 168, at 739.
194. See id. ("Liquidity constraints, as well as collective action problems, can prevent
shareholders from exercising preemptive rights.").
195. One carve out to crowdfunders' right to exercise preemptive rights would be their
eligibility under securities laws to participate in a follow-on round of financing. Crowdfunders
who are accredited investors could invest under Rule 506 (and up to thirty-five unaccredited
investors could, too). Unaccredited crowdfunders could likely invest under Rule 504 because, as
existing stockholders of the company, they would have a preexisting relationship with the
company.
196. Preemptive rights provisions could potentially include oversubscription rights and
pay-to-play penalties. Oversubscription rights are triggered when some shareholders choose not
to exercise their preemptive rights, giving the shareholders who do exercise the rights the option
to also purchase the shares the nonparticipating shareholders could have bought. William J.
Schnoor, Jr., Key Issues in Follow-On Financing Rounds, in VENTURE CAPITAL 2011: NUTS &
BOLTS 295, 297 (2011). Whereas oversubscription rights benefit investors, "[play-to-play
provisions . . . provide 'teeth' to the pre-emptive rights . . . [by imposing] penalties on investors
that do not purchase their pro rata portion . . . ." Id. at 298. The penalties can range from the
severe (automatic conversion of preferred stock into common stock) to the more benign (loss of
anti-dilution protection or preemptive rights for future financings). Id. at 298-99; see Bartlett,
supra note 148, at 57.
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approach is more closely, or at least as closely, aligned with the
Commission's mission to protect investors than disclosure
requirements designed to warn investors of danger, and it avoids the
defects of merit review (e.g., administrative burdens, filing delays and
market inefficiencies) precisely because it does not involve review or
regulatory approval.
A qualitative-mandates philosophy incorporates and applies
the notion of "libertarian paternalism,"1 9 7 which recognizes that, due
to "the likely effects of default rules, framing effects, and starting
points on choices and preferences, paternalism, at least in a weak
sense, is impossible to avoid."198 Thus, "the term 'paternalistic' should
not be considered pejorative, just descriptive."199 By this definition,
the crowdfunding provisions of the JOBS Act and the Commission's
implementing regulations are unavoidably paternalistic200 because
they create default rules, framing effects, and a starting point for how
crowdfunding investment will operate.20 1
Similarly, a qualitative-mandates approach is consistent with
the view that the Commission can help provide "what would be the
collective contract of many disaggregated investors if there were an
efficient mechanism for each to contract separately and well. In this
manner, the [Commission] can be viewed as the collective bargaining
agent for investors, although one could argue that it need not be that
way."2 0 2 In the case of crowdfunding investment, this Article argues
that it should be that way,203 in large part due precisely to
197. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1163 (2003).
198. Id. at 1166.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1182 ("[E]ffects [of default rules, framing effects and starting points] are often
unavoidable.. . . But in an important respect the anti-paternalist position is incoherent, simply
because there is no way to avoid effects on behavior and choices."); see also Christine Jolls et al.,
A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1535 (1998) ("[1]n the real
world, she who provides information ends up giving advice.").
201. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 197, at 1184 ("The inevitability of paternalism is
most clear when the planner has to choose starting points or default rules.").
202. Wallman, supra note 94, at 351-52.
203. Certainly, a qualitative-mandates approach demands restraint of overly
paternalistic impulses that intrude on issuers' and investors' rights (and the market's ability) to
set the terms of private contracts, even more so in other contexts where bargaining-power
disparity and collective-action problems are not as prominent as they are in crowdfunding
investment. It also requires balancing of flexible principles-based versus strict rules-based
regulation so that bright-line rules cannot be substantively skirted but technically obeyed, and
principles can be predictably applied. See Coffee, Jr. & Sale, supra note 123, at 752-53
("Although the debate about rules-based and principles-based standards often occurs as if the
two never overlap, in reality they usually coexist. . . . Most systems are really combinations of
the two, with the major difference being the location of the system's center of gravity in one or
the other system." (footnote omitted)).
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disaggregated crowdfunding investors' probable inability to negotiate
necessary venture capitalist protections in start-up company
investments.
Crowdfunding investment's unique characteristics cry out for
an innovative regulatory paradigm that is not held hostage to the
reigning disclosure-based philosophy. Meaningful disclosure is not
enough to protect retail investors. After all, Eduardo Saverin received
adequate disclosure in The Social Network, but it did not protect
him.2 0 4 Mr. Saverin, as a Harvard business major and cofounder of
Facebook, was no less (and was possibly more) sophisticated than
many crowdfunding investors will likely be. Yet, he undoubtedly
could have used negotiating assistance when venture capitalists
invested millions of dollars to bankroll Facebook's astounding growth
from the humble roots that Mr. Saverin's initial $19,000 investment
had nurtured.
Applying a qualitative-mandates philosophy to crowdfunding
investment results in the pursuit of optimal ways to help crowds of
unsophisticated investors obtain necessary venture capitalist
protections in start-up company investments. These protections
approximate the protections that crowdfunders would likely demand if
they were knowledgeable about investing in start-up companies and
did not suffer from the collective-action problems that could prevent
them from bargaining for appropriate protections on their own. A
qualitative-mandates approach seeks to use framing effects, starting
points, and default rules to guide crowdfunders toward investor
protections patterned off of market-based venture capital deal
terms.2 0 5 Similar to how the efficient market hypothesis posits that
retail investors piggyback on professional investment analysts'
204. Facebook counsel to Mr. Saverin:
[There are] four documents. The first two are common stock purchase agreements,
allowing you to buy stock in the newly reincorporated Facebook as opposed to the old
shares, which are completely worthless. The third is the exchange agreement allowing
you to exchange the old shares for new shares, and then finally a voter holding
agreement.
THE SOcIAL NETWORK, supra note 1.
205. Some venture capitalist protections relate to the unique contributions venture
capitalists make to portfolio companies. See Smith, supra note 163, at 953-54 (citing surveys
finding that entrepreneurs most value venture capitalists' management expertise, advice, and
access to additional financing). In exchange, venture capitalists typically receive "significant
rights of control over the new venture." Id. at 952. Crowdfunders will normally not provide
management expertise, so board seats or other direct control rights will usually not be justified
for crowdfunders, and even if they received such rights, it is not clear how a group of widely
dispersed people would exercise them effectively. However, crowdfunders do offer contributions
that venture capitalists do not, such as a wide potential customer base (with higher margins
after cutting out middlemen), viral marketing, Internet social networking, and "feedback and
endorsements that build awareness and forward momentum." Satorius & Pollard, supra note 29.
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scrutiny of public companies,206 this Article's qualitative-mandates
proposal suggests that crowdfunders should piggyback on professional
venture capitalists' market-based protections included in typical
start-up company investments. The proposal also implements the
recommendation that "securities regulation needs to focus to a greater
extent on the user of information. . . . It might be that we get more
out of disclosure with less of it."207 Several possible mechanisms for
protecting crowdfunders from venture-capitalist risks are proposed
below: contractual provisions, disclosure tables targeted to
venture-capital deal terms, and statutory rules and regulations.
A. Contractual Provisions
Virtually no sophisticated venture capitalist invests in start-up
companies without certain fundamental protections present in
preferred-stock contractual arrangements, such as anti-dilution
provisions and tag-along rights.2 08  Crowdfunders, though, are
unlikely to negotiate similar protections because of their weak
bargaining positions (due in large part to collective-action problems)
and lack of sophistication in start-up company investing. Therefore,
in the interest of protecting investors and facilitating efficient
contracting practices, legal rules could provide a starting point for
crowdfunding investment contracts by encouraging the use of
market-based investment templates that include standard
venture-capitalist protections.209
This approach would ensure that venture-capital deal terms
and protections are present by default in crowdfunding-investment
contract templates and would lower the cost for start-up companies to
produce (or have lawyers draft) investment contracts.210 Also, it would
206. Paredes, supra note 113, at 453.
207. Id. at 485.
208. E.g., Bartlett, supra note 148, at 58-59 (observing that in a sample of 155
venture-backed companies between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2004, 97 percent "issued
preferred stock to their VC investors"); see also In re Appraisal of Metromedia Int'l Grp., Inc., 971
A.2d 893, 900 (Del. Ch. 2009) ("Unlike common stock, the value of preferred stock is determined
solely from the contract[ual] rights conferred upon it in the certificate of designation.").
209. At least one senator is on record as favoring the use of template agreements by
funding portals. 158 CONG. REc. S2,231 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 2012) (statement of Sen. Michael
Bennet) ("[Flunding portals should be allowed to engage in due diligence services. This would
include providing templates and forms, which will enable issuers to comply with the underlying
statute. In crafting this law, it was our intent to allow funding portals to provide such services.").
210. Robert B. Ahdieh, The Strategy of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1038, 1051
(2006) (noting that "the heart of bargaining is not conflict but coordination" and "contract
bargaining is fairly understood as a type of coordination game"). Crowdfunding companies and
investors each have an interest in minimizing wrangling over contractual language, which will
tend to lead each party to standard agreements that reduce novelty. See e.g., id. at 1034 ("Yet
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allow crowdfunders to more easily compare the terms of investment
contracts in different offerings-if an issuer modified a default
template agreement, then the issuer could be required to post a
redline version of the agreement on the funding portal so that all
investors could view the changes. In addition, investors would need to
learn only once where to look for key provisions, and funding portals
could teach about the default template agreements in their required
investor-education tests.211
Unlike venture capitalists that invest in start-up companies, it
is unrealistic for each crowdfunding party to hire sophisticated
counsel to negotiate a unique agreement. Crowdfunders are
disaggregated, often unsophisticated investors who will likely struggle
to coordinate effective negotiation strategies and generally lack the
knowledge of what investor protections to demand. Therefore, legal
rules should help compensate for crowdfunders' deficiencies and level
the playing field by framing the terms of default investment contracts
in a way that protects crowdfunders.212
Template agreements can have a powerful effect on
negotiations, as research on boilerplate contract terms,213 the
endowment effect, starting points, and framing effectS2 14 bears
witness. Using the tools suggested by this research is especially
appropriate where "default rules, framing effects, and starting points
are enlisted in the interest of vulnerable third parties,"215 such as
crowds of unsophisticated retail investors investing in start-up
companies over the Internet. Of course, crowdfunding investors and
companies would retain free choice to opt for alternative
arrangements that vary from the baseline agreements.216 Thus,
standard terms would appear to be no less widespread in contracts among the sophisticated.");
Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1130 (2006)
("Boilerplate contracts, however, are found in many markets where the relationship between the
parties is not characterized by power imbalances. Instead, we find sophisticated parties on both
sides . . . with their slight variations on the same set of boilerplate terms.").
211. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 301(b)(a), 126 Stat.
306 (2012).
212. See Wallman, supra note 94, at 351-52.
213. Ahdieh, supra note 210, at 1051, 1054 (asserting that boilerplate terms offer "a
'focal point"' to facilitate resolution of negotiations and shape "expectations of the likely behavior
of other [s]").
214. See generally Jolls et al., supra note 200, at 1497-99 (asserting behavioral
economics has influenced the assignment of legal entitlements); Sunstein & Thaler, supra note
197, at 1171-81 (detailing the effects of paternalism in rules and default plans).
215. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 197, at 1162; see also Jolls et al., supra note 200, at
1513 ("[T]he likelihood, from the perspective of behavioral law and economics, that observed laws
reflect . . . fairness considerations as well as efficiency and conventional forms of rent seeking.").
216. See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 197, at 1159 ("[Llibertarian paternalists should
attempt to steer people's choices in welfare-promoting directions without eliminating freedom of
choice.").
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market dynamics would ultimately guide the parties to final
contractual provisions within the framework of using templates that
reflect standard venture-capital deal terms as a starting point.
Though companies and crowdfunders could theoretically
bargain over contractual terms, in most cases companies will likely
offer take-it-or-leave-it click-through agreements, following the norm
of electronic commerce.217  Therefore, if crowdfunding laws and
regulations require companies to post redline agreements that show
changes from market-based templates, then even though
crowdfunders will have limited ability to negotiate investment terms,
they will be more likely to become aware of unfavorable provisions and
can more easily compare the terms of different offerings. Ideally, this
would result in a more competitive and transparent market among
issuers of crowdfunded securities. And as issuers compete for
investors, crowdfunders will likely obtain more favorable investor
protections.
Available evidence on crowdfunding suggests the market will
develop standard-form contracts2 18 whether or not legal rules
influence the content of template agreements-ProFounder provided
investment-contract templates before it shut down219  and
crowdfunding sites that facilitate peer-to-peer lending use template
loan agreements today.220 In view of this existing market dynamic,
legal rules should guide crowdfunding companies and investors
toward appropriate investor protections, patterned off of applicable
217. Tal Kastner, The Persisting Ideal of Agreement in an Age of Boilerplate, 35 LAW &
Soc. INQUIRY 793, 800-01 (2010) (commenting on "the largely nonnegotiated, standardized
language of contracts that has become pervasive in contemporary American life"); Margaret Jane
Radin, Reconsidering Boilerplate: Confronting Normative and Democratic Degradation, 40 CAP.
U. L. REV. 617, 617-19 (2012) (discussing the widespread use of boilerplate and examining the
legal implications); see generally Richard Warner & Robert H. Sloan, Behavioral Advertising:
From One-Sided Chicken to Informational Norms, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 49 (2012).
218. Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Three and a Half Minute Transaction:
Boilerplate and the Limits of Contract Design, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 6 (2011) (discussing
boilerplate that results in part from the legal industry's "business model that relies on herd
behavior, fails to provide incentives for innovation, and thus rises and falls on volume-based,
cookie-cutter transactions"). Boilerplate might not be ideal, but in practice, template agreements,
including boilerplate provisions, are likely to characterize crowdfunding investment because it
will be cost-effective to structure crowdfunding transactions through standardized forms. The
legal industry continues to move toward using technology to streamline legal processes, and the
use of standard contracts in crowdfunding investment would align with these efficiencies and
trends. See, e.g., William D. Henderson, Three Generations of U.S. Lawyers: Generalists,
Specialists, Project Managers, 70 MD. L. REV. 373 (2011); About Novus Law, NOVUS LAW,
http://www.novuslaw.comlabout-novus-law-document-management-lpo.aspx (last visited Nov. 12,
2012); About Rocket Lawyer, ROCKET LAWYER, http://www.rocketlawyer.com/about-us.rl (last
visited Nov. 12, 2012); About Us, LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com/about-us (last visited
Nov. 12, 2012).
219. ProFounder Order, supra note 50, at 3.
220. Verstein, supra note 16, at 463.
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economic terms venture capitalists routinely require, as the baseline
default arrangement that frames crowdfunding contracting
practices.221
B. Venture Capital-Deal-Terms Disclosure Table
Another way legal rules can help crowdfunders obtain
necessary venture-capitalist protections is through an easy-to-read
disclosure table222 that frames investment decisions around the
horizontal and upside risks inherent in crowdfunding. The JOBS Act
requires the Commission to promulgate crowdfunding disclosure
rules,223 and instead of rules that lead to dense disclosure documents
characteristic of other securities-law exemptions,224 the Commission
should set the default rules in a way that facilitates venture-capitalist
investor protections for crowdfunders.225
A disclosure table like the one described below would frame the
terms of crowdfunding investment by graphically highlighting the
investor protections the company is offering. The table would reflect
the essential terms venture capitalists negotiate when investing in
start-up companies, especially terms relating to the economic value of
221. The Commission could encourage the use of template agreements in a variety of
ways. In a hands-on approach, the Commission could convene a working group of industry
experts to create standard agreements (the Venture Capital Financing Model Legal Documents
would be an easy place to start, and the Commission could also collaborate with the newly
formed crowdfunding self-regulatory body). Model Legal Documents, NAT'L VENTURE CAP. Ass'N,
http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com-content&view=article&id=108&Itemid=136 (last
visited Nov. 12, 2012). Or the Commission could defer to each funding portal to create its own
template agreements, though one concern would be proliferation of different templates, making
it more difficult for crowdfunders to learn the agreements and compare the terms of offerings on
different portals.
222. Commentators and the Commission have focused on disclosure tables and other
formatting questions for years. E.g., Paredes, supra note 113, at 476 (encouraging the
Commission to use "more charts, graphs and tables" and noting the Commission's increasing
"sensitiv[ity] to formatting considerations").
223. E.g., Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 301(b)(a)(3),
(a)(12), (b)(1), (b)(5), 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
224. Though Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 8, at 938, do not provide specific
implementing proposals, they agree in principle that dense disclosures should be avoided in
crowdfunding investment: "Transparency-meaning not necessarily more disclosure, but more
targeted, simple, easy-to-access disclosure-should support more effective transmission of
information to the potentially inexperienced or less experienced Internet investors that are
among those attracted to crowdfunding." See also Verstein, supra note 16, at 524 (discussing the
inadequacy of the Commission's disclosure-based regulatory approach for the person-to-person
lending model of crowdfunding, and lamenting securities law requirements of "thick
prospectuses and lengthy, unnecessary disclosures" of complex risks).
225. The Act requires three types of disclosures: general disclosures for which funding
portals are primarily responsible, company-specific business disclosures, and technical risk
disclosures. The disclosure table discussed in this Article relates to the third type. For a broader
discussion of crowdfunding disclosure requirements, see Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 78.
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the investment, such as anti-dilution protections and tag-along rights.
This streamlined approach to disclosure would force to the surface the
fundamental issues related to investing in start-up companies, but
which would likely not be top-of-mind for the average retail investor.
A disclosure table would be cost-effective for companies to produce and
useful to investors, especially unsophisticated ones, and would help
crowdfunders decipher the meaning of more complex contractual
language.
The disclosure table could be presented as follows, with the
"Description" column modified to match the terms of each deal.226
Venture Capital-Deal-Terms Disclosure Table
Term Yes or Description
No
Common Yes/No Common stock does not have any of the protections
Stock in this table.
Preferred Yes/No Preferred stock includes the protections in your
Stock investment contract, as summarized in this table.
WarrantS227  Yes/No In addition to your preferred stock, you may
exercise warrants to purchase common stock equal
to 1 percent of the number of preferred shares you
are purchasing. You would typically exercise
warrants only in a qualified public offering.
Shares-Based Yes/No If our common stock splits or we issue common
Dilution stock as a dividend, your preferred shares will
adjust accordingly so that they convert into the
same percentage of common shares.
226. For an overview of venture capital deal terms, see generally Ellen B. Corenswet &
Sarah Reed, Introduction to Venture Capital Deal Terms, in VENTURE CAPITAL 2012: NUTS AND
BOLTS 61 (2012).
227. Warrants are an example of an upside benefit (an equity "kicker") that companies
might use to attract investment. Including warrants in the disclosure table will help make
companies and investors aware of them so the parties can include them if desired. See Bo
Sartain, Commentary: The Impact of Warrants on Venture Capital Preferred Stock Financings,
40 TEX. J. Bus. L. 453, 456 (2005) (describing warrants as "the right, but not the obligation, to
purchase" additional shares and noting that warrants are normally exercised "immediately prior
to a liquidity event" and only if the exercise price is less than the sale price in the liquidity
event). Thus, "the warrant is not ... intended to minimize . . . down-side exposure, but is a
reward ... [of] more up-side return if the ... company is successful"). Id.
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Venture Capital-Deal-Terms Disclosure Table
Term Yes or Description
No
Price-Based Yes/No If we sell stock to someone else (except if we issue
Dilution228 common stock to our strategic partners, like
employees) for a lower price per share than what
you are paying, the number of shares that you own
will increase following the weighted average
formula in your investment contract.
Tag-Along Yes/No If we (or other stockholders) sell stock in a qualified
Rights offering (e.g., not including common stock we issue
to our strategic partners, like employees), you can
choose to sell your shares in the same offering and
at the same price.
Drag-Along Yes/No If you own at least 50 percent of the outstanding
RightS229  shares of the company and you decide to sell your
shares, you can force other stockholders to sell their
shares, too.
Preemptive Yes/No If we sell stock to someone else (except for issuing
Rights common stock to our strategic partners, like
employees), you can buy shares in the same offering
in order to keep your percentage ownership of the
company the same, or in some cases even increase
your percentage ownership.
Pay-to-Play230 Yes/No If you do not exercise your preemptive rights, you
will lose your preemptive rights for any subsequent
rounds of financing.
Cumulative Yes/No Your preferred stock will accrue a dividend of 5
Dividends percent per year and will be paid to you if the
company pays dividends or is sold in a qualified
sale.
228. This is an example of where template agreements would complement the disclosure
table. If there were template agreements to reference, the description column should also state:
"The key term in the anti-dilution formula is 'Outstanding Common Stock."' Then, issuers should
include whichever of the following three statements applied: 'We have not changed the definition
from the template agreement"; 'We have broadened the definition from the template agreement,
which decreases the effectiveness of the formula for you"; or, 'We have narrowed the definition
from the template agreement, which increases the effectiveness of the formula for you." See
Understanding Price-Based Antidilution Protection, supra note 169, at 40-42.
229. Rather than crowdfunders having drag-along rights, issuers or other (especially
majority) investors might want to enforce drag-along rights against crowdfunders to lessen
hold-out problems and drag crowdfunders into certain corporate transactions.
230. See supra note 196 for a brief discussion of other potential consequences of a
pay-to-play provision.
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Venture C apital-Deal-Terms Disclosure Table
Term Yes or Description
No
Registration Yes/No You can force us to sell your shares in a public
Rights offering if at least 50 percent of the stockholders
vote in favor and either we have already had a
qualified public offering or it has been more than
five years since you purchased your shares.
Redemption Yes/No If it has been more than five years since you
RightS231  purchased your shares, you can force us to buy your
shares back from you at the same price you paid,
plus interest at 5 percent per year.
Liquidation Yes/No If we sell the company in a qualified sale, you will
Preference receive two times the amount of your investment
before the common stockholders receive any
proceeds from the sale. Then, you will receive
additional proceeds from the sale on a pro rata
basis with the common stockholders.
Though the table does not include the nuances of each
venture-capital deal term, it is more understandable than a narrative
description and is more cost-effective for small companies to prepare.
Furthermore, prominent disclosure of venture capital protections
could help foster a competitive market in which investors could easily
compare the terms of different offerings,232 making it more likely that
crowdfunding companies would compete with each other for investors
based on venture capital deal terms, likely resulting in crowdfunders
obtaining better protections.233 The terms in the disclosure table
would also likely become a point of Internet dialogue among
crowdfunding investors and companies, thereby framing the
231. Instead of interest, cumulative dividends could be payable upon exercise of the
redemption right.
232. Compare Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 8, at 938-39 (arguing for standardized
disclosures as "a potential source of economic efficiencies that may help constrain costs ... while
also protecting investors"), with Bradford, supra note 8, at 143-44 (arguing against standardized
disclosures because it could "discourage experimentation and freeze its [i.e., crowdfunding's]
development").
233. The disclosure table could evolve to include a column labeled "incremental price per
share," designed for investors to select, and pay for, the protections they want on an a la carte
basis. See, e.g., Radin, supra, note 217, at 653-55 (referencing an a la carte market for variable
extended warranties on cars, computers, and washing machines and proposing an online system
of "[ilncreased customization of transactions" where "a consumer could check a box to pay an
extra" amount for selected provisions, such as warranties and the right to a jury); Sunstein &
Thaler, supra note 197, at 1175-76 (describing two states that set opposite default rules for car
insurance and allowed drivers to select and pay for a la carte provisions, and concluding that
"[i]n both cases, the default rule tended to stick").
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development of the Internet's "wisdom of the crowd" around the
venture-capital deal terms that are most important to
crowdfunders.2 34
Accessible, easy-to-read disclosures are more appropriate for
crowdfunding investment than dense, prospectus-like disclosures,
which unsophisticated investors often do not read or understand, were
developed in a different context, and are expensive to draft. Unlike
the era when detailed narrative disclosures became commonplace,
today, information over the Internet is plentiful, communication is
inexpensive, investments are made with the click of a button, a visual
presentation is customary for web users, and a graphic interface is
easy to implement.235  Crowdfunding investment is unique, and
therefore the Commission should tailor disclosure requirements to
crowdfunding's specific characteristics and risks.236
C. Congressional and Regulatory Action
Apart from contractual protections and targeted disclosure,
Congress could amend the Act, or the Commission could define the
scope of Rule 10b2 37 as applied to crowdfunding investment. This
would not only provide crowdfunders with venture-capital protections
against horizontal, upside risks but also bring predictability to
potential crowdfunding liabilities. Such statutory or regulatory
measures could come in any number of forms.
234. For discussions of the wisdom of the crowd in crowdfunding, see generally Bradford,
supra note 8, at 134-36; John S. Wroldsen, The Crowdfund Act's Strange Bedfellows: Democracy
and Start-Up Company Investing (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
235. See, e.g., Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 8, at 933-37 ("[T]he Internet may
over-inform and, as a result, obfuscate or bury important information . . . ."); Pope, supra note 8,
at 983 ("Although twenty-first century investors have access to much more information available
to the public through the internet, the Commission seems stuck in the early twentieth century,
regulating based on an outdated assumption that investors have limited access to restricted
information.").
236. Other examples of easy-to-read disclosure tables include public company disclosures
of executive compensation, see Executive Compensation Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126 (Oct. 16,
1992); 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2011), and credit-card interest rates and late fees, 12 C.F.R. § 226.5
(2011). Also, one commentator has proposed a standard disclosure table for home loans. Willis,
supra note 118, at 712, 820 (criticizing "federal law governing home lending [because it] requires
that borrowers be given an avalanche of disclosures, but has few substantive requirements for
home loans," and suggesting a disclosure table to simplify and standardize home loans in a way
that makes "pricing easily observable" to facilitate "effective price shopping").
237. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act of 1934 authorizes the Commission to prescribe
rules and regulations against "any manipulative or deceptive device" that is used "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security . . . as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-2 (2006). Under
this authority, the Commission has developed various rules, ranging from the generic Rule
10b-5, which addresses fraud in securities transactions generally, to more specific rules, such as
Rule 10b-18, which provides a safe-harbor for issuer repurchases of stock.
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For instance, Congress could prohibit dilution of the value of
crowdfunders' shares in subsequent financings, subject to specified
exceptions, such as the opportunity to either purchase shares in the
new financing (akin to preemptive rights) or sell shares to the new
investors on substantially similar terms and conditions. Congress also
could essentially codify tag-along rights, as other countries have done
in other contexts,238 by requiring companies to give crowdfunders the
opportunity to participate in qualified private sales or resale of the
company's securities. Another possibility would be for Congress to
require a minimum, market-based return to crowdfunders, before
other stockholders receive proceeds of a distribution, upon specified
corporate events, such as a merger, sale, or liquidation of the company
(akin to venture-capitalist liquidation preferences).139
The Commission, for its part, could amend Rule 10b to
accomplish similar goals. For example, the Commission could clarify
under what circumstances the dilution of crowdfunders' ownership
interests in subsequent financings, or exclusion of crowdfunders from
corporate events (such as private sales or resale of the company's
securities), would be subject to Rule 10b liability. Such a rule, along
with appropriate carve-outs and safe-harbors,240 would protect
investors and bring predictability to how issuers and funding portals
could be liable, or could avoid liability, in transactions involving or
affecting crowdfunded securities.
238. E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and
Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757,
1810 (2002) ("[N~on-voting shares now enjoy full 'tag along' rights in the event of takeover offers
[in Mexico]."); Ronald J. Gilson et al., Regulatory Dualism as a Development Strategy: Corporate
Reform in Brazil, the United States, and the European Union, 63 STAN. L. REV. 475, 491 (2011)
(noting that Brazilian "Novo Mercado" rules impose "a mandatory bid rule under which the
purchaser of a controlling block of stock must offer to purchase the rest of the company's stock at
the same price per share"); Cally Jordan, The Chameleon Effect: Beyond the Bonding Hypothesis
for Cross-Listed Securities, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 37, 71 (2006) ("Where there are dual class
shares . .. mandatory coattails or tag-along rights are usual [in Canada].").
239. "Venture capital preferred stock almost always is granted a 'liquidation preference,'
that is, the right to receive proceeds from a merger, sale or liquidation of the company before any
amounts may be paid to the holders of the common stock (which is typically held by founders and
employees)." Warren, supra note 176, at 514-17 ("[A] dividend that has been declared on the
preferred stock, but not yet paid, usually must be paid as part of a liquidation priority preference
payment . . . [that] [o]ver time . . . can create a significant shift in value to the preferred
stockholders."). The points of negotiation revolve around the amount of the liquidation
preference (e.g., equal to, or two times, the amount invested) and whether the preferred
stockholders will, in addition to receiving the preferred distribution of proceeds, also share pro
rata in the distribution of the remaining proceeds (i.e., participating or non-participating). Id.
240. For instance, tag-along rights might only be triggered if the sale or resale involved
more than a certain percentage of the company's securities. Also, standard carve-outs, such as
issuance of shares to employees, should be included. A safe-harbor for avoiding liability under
the rule could include disclosure requirements related to the impending corporate event and a
specified waiting period for crowdfunders to elect whether to participate.
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The statutory or rules-based approach could be more effective
than the template contractual provisions and disclosure-table
recommendations described above because framing effects, default
rules, and starting points are vulnerable to circumvention: "When
firms oppose nudges[, such as template agreements and disclosure
tables], substantive regulation aimed directly at placing consumers in
welfare-enhancing positions will certainly be more transparent, and is
likely to be more effective and less costly as well." 24 1 Some issuers of
crowdfunded securities will undoubtedly resist granting crowdfunding
investors preferred protections. Thus, if crowdfunding investors lack
sufficient market power to translate default template agreements or
specially tailored disclosure tables into actual protections, then
substantive regulation offers a potentially stronger and less malleable
instrument for investor protection.
Regardless of the mechanism(s) used to help crowdfunders, the
investor protections must not overreach and excessively impinge on a
crowdfunded company's operations or ability to raise subsequent
rounds of financing from other investors, such as venture capitalists.
The nature of crowdfunding, with its open invitation to hundreds or
even thousands of ground-floor investors, is antithetical to a start-up
company's limited operational capacities. Therefore, wherever
possible, investor protection measures should minimize burdens on
small companies. For instance, and as additional research will
explore further,242 funding portals could route companies' ongoing
investor communications to crowdfunders even after the closing of the
initial financing (including communications that give crowdfunders a
defined window of opportunity to exercise preferential rights, such as
anti-dilution, tag-along, and preemptive rights). Also, designation of a
crowdfunding-investor representative could help alleviate
collective-action problems related to crowdfunders exercising
preferential rights efficiently.
241. Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 47, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. [|
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2142989&
download=yes.
242. Another area the Author is developing explores early exit events for crowdfunders
(such as pre-negotiated cash-out payments through stock buy-backs funded by subsequent
venture capital investors). So long as crowdfunders receive reasonable and fair protections, an
early exit event could benefit the crowdfunded company, the crowdfunding investors and the
subsequent investors. The crowdfunding investors would receive an acceptable rate of return and
an early liquidity event on their ground-floor investment, and the company and venture
capitalists would be free of the potential burden of too many early-stage investors.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The JOBS Act's initiative to open start-up company investing
to the masses through crowdfunding is an important democratic step
toward modernizing securities laws to comport with contemporary
Internet investment practices. But the shortcomings of the
crowdfunding provisions of the Act, particularly the absence of
venture capitalist protections, leave crowdfunding investors
vulnerable even when they invest in successful start-up companies.
Therefore, crowdfunding statutes and regulations should seek to
protect crowdfunding investors from the horizontal risks of
sophisticated venture capitalists without unduly burdening the
developing market of crowdfunding investment.
Securities laws that establish the ground-rules for
crowdfunding investment must not merely discourage fraud but
should also help crowdfunders preserve and harvest the fruits of their
investments in successful companies.243 Granting the masses access
to start-up company investment opportunities previously reserved for
sophisticated venture capitalists exposes retail investors to a
potentially greater danger than fraud or failure: success. As Eduardo
Saverin learned in The Social Network, venture capitalists and their
lawyers have developed intricate strategies for protecting the value of
their investments. They know that failing to secure the value of their
ground-floor investment in a start-up company that rises to great
heights represents a greater potential loss of profits than the cost of a
doomed investment in a fraudulent or failed venture.
Thus, crowdfunding statutes and regulations should facilitate
the ability of crowdfunders to receive upside protection from the
horizontal threats of venture capitalists, whether through contractual
provisions, streamlined and targeted disclosure tables, or statutory or
regulatory measures. Without upside protections characteristic of
venture-capitalist agreements, crowdfunders, like Mr. Saverin, will be
vulnerable to venture capitalists swooping in to reap the fruits of
crowdfunders' ground-floor investments in successful start-up
companies.
243. An interesting corollary is found in Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt,
Economically Benevolent Dictators: Lessons for Developing Democracies, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 227,
232-33 (2011), where the authors analyze several "economically benevolent" autocracies and,
like one "autocratic champion of transitions-the private equity investor," find that an
"economically benevolent autocracy is able to assure economic actors that pledges . . . to allow
economic actors to keep the fruits of their investments will be honored." For crowdfunding laws
to be economically benevolent toward crowdfunding investors, they must honor the promise of
crowdfunding and help crowdfunders keep the fruits of ground-floor investments in successful
start-up companies.
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